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Abstract
The war in Vietnam divided America into two groups, those who
supported the war and those who opposed. At wars end, the divisions did not
disappear. Instead, the nation was split on the question of amnesty for draft and
military offenders who avoided service during the war. Gerald R. Ford, upon his
ascendancy to the presidency, was left with the monumental task of resolving
the fate of draft and military offenders and ushering in an era of unification and
reconciliation by answering the amnesty question.
This study examines the factors surrounding President Ford’s decision to
extend clemency to draft and military offenders of the Vietnam era. President
Ford was faced with the need to heal the nation, but confined by the possibility
of exacerbating the divisions within America regarding amnesty. In deciding to
extend clemency, Ford was influenced by draft and military offenders
themselves, the debate on amnesty, including its coverage in news media and the
symbolic nature of the debate, public opinion and Ford’s personal and political
influences. These influences led Ford towards a middle path in his attempt to
resolve the issue of amnesty. Ford’s clemency program offered conditional
amnesty, a concept supported by the majority of Americans, to draft and military
offenders in order to provide them with an opportunity to return and contribute
to the rebuilding of America in the post-Vietnam era and begin the healing
process by trying to appease all considering the amnesty question.
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Introduction
The cease-fire agreement signed by Henry Kissinger and Lo Duc Tho on
January 28, 1973 ended American military involvement in the Vietnam War.
However, the war on the home-front, fought in the homes, campuses and streets
of America, raged on. The cease-fire agreement ended a decade-long struggle
between the United States and its South Vietnamese allies against communist
North Vietnam. Although American involvement in Vietnam began with the
Truman administration, the commitment of American combat troops to Vietnam
began in earnest following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 6, 1964,
which provided President Johnson with a functional declaration of war. As
American involvement in Vietnam increased, so did divisions among
Americans. Not since the divisions caused by geographical location during the
Civil War, had Americans been so divided on a conflict. The Vietnam War,
however, did not divide the nation based on their location. Instead, divisions
stemmed from individuals’ judgment on whether or not the United States should
be involved in Vietnam.
As the war progressed, so did the antiwar movement and the divide in
America deepened. Developing from the peace movements of the late 1950s and
early 1960s, the antiwar movement called on individuals to join in a struggle
challenging what they perceived as an immoral, unjust and undeclared war. The
anti-war movement called upon individuals to resist the war in Vietnam by any
means. This led to a wide variety of  protest, that ranged from peaceful and
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educational, such as teach-ins held throughout the country, to violent and
aggressive like the draft board bombings perpetrated by the “Catonsville 9”.
The use of conscription through the Selective Service System during the
Vietnam Era ensured that young American males could not stand aside and let
others fight the war abroad and at home. For those who supported American
involvement in Vietnam, the decision was easy: enlist before being drafted and
fight the spread of communism in Southeast Asia or obtain a deferment or
exemption for one of various reasons and support the war effort from home.
Those who opposed American intervention in Vietnam confronted a
much larger predicament: Trying to obtain a deferment or exemption for any
number of reasons, including medical fitness (physical and mental), occupation,
Conscientious Objection or extreme hardship, was one option. This option,
however, was difficult to take if you did not seriously qualify for a deferment.
The fate of individuals who tried to fake medical conditions or seek
Conscientious Objector status to receive deferments were left in the hands of the
local draft board, making them subject to their whims.
Other young Americans who were drafted and either failed to qualify for
deferments or spurned deferments or exemptions because they did not want to
use a technicality in their resistance of the war were left with few choices. One
option was to resist the war effort by failing to report for induction and face a
prison sentence. This option was not very attractive because draft violations
were punished with a maximum five-year sentence. However, this option did
legitimize their resistance to the war because they were not running away from
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the consequences of their actions, instead they were “taking their lumps” for
their opposition.
Another option was to evade the draft and the authorities by living in the
American “underground”, a network of priests, radicals and ordinary citizens
who helped offenders move from place to place and settle into new
communities.1 Individuals who resisted the draft by destroying their draft cards,
not registering for the draft after their eighteenth birthday or using violent tactics
to destroy the draft system turned to the “underground” to live the life of a
fugitive. Once again, this option was not considered lightly by offenders. Living
your life on the run from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
authorities led to loneliness and paranoia.
The final option for individuals who were drafted and facing induction
was to seek asylum in another country and become an exile. There were only
two real options for exiles who wanted to settle down; Canada or Sweden.
Similar to the other options available to offenders, this was not an easy decision
to make. Offenders who chose exile left their friends and family behind and
began a new life alone in a foreign country. For some, the transition proved
successful and they became citizens of their new nation and built new lives for
themselves. For others, life in a new nation was overwhelming and many looked
longingly to return to the United States.
Draft offenders were not the only ones faced with difficult decisions
regarding their opposition to American involvement in Vietnam. Many young
1 1 Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War
and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), 171.
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Americans who did not know their options in resisting the draft (seeking
deferments, exile or living underground) faced the problem of induction into the
military and active duties in Southeast Asia. Military offenders faced the
prospects of desertion and living in exile or the “underground” or the issuance of
a less-than-honourable discharge. Like the options for draft offenders, military
offenders faced a life on the lam, away from home or handicapped by a less-
than-honourable discharge.
The actions of draft and military offenders during the Vietnam era split
the nation between those who supported the war and those who did not. But the
division within America did not end with the war. The conclusion of the war
brought forth the debate on amnesty for draft and military offenders. Divided
between those in support of general amnesty, conditional amnesty and no
amnesty, America debated the fate of the individuals who resisted the war and
were living in exile, the “underground”, on the lam or in a disadvantaged
position because of their opposition to American intervention in Vietnam.
The amnesty issue did not only consider the fate of draft and military
offenders, but also the healing of the wounds caused by the Vietnam War. The
war in Vietnam, combined with the Watergate scandal, left many American’s
with a feeling of distrust towards their government and an opportunity for the
government to renew its relationship with the people and heal the divide within
America. In a twist of fate caused by the Watergate scandal, Gerald R. Ford,
through the 25th amendment, became the 38th president of the United States after
the resignation of former President Nixon. Left with the task of healing the
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nation and restoring their faith in the presidency, President Ford set about the
task during his administration.
By the time of the Ford presidency, divisions in America caused by the
involvement in Vietnam and draft and military offenders’ opposition to the war
needed to be addressed in order to strengthen the nation and restore citizens’
faith. The amnesty issue, however, further divided the nation because of
opposing ideas regarding how draft and military offenders should be dealt with.
President Ford was faced with the need to heal the nation, but confined by the
possibility of exacerbating the divisions within America regarding amnesty. In
order to deal with the issue and begin the healing process, President Ford created
a program of clemency for draft and military offenders, which was influenced
by the offenders themselves, the amnesty debate, including its coverage in news
media and the symbolic nature of the debate, public opinion and President
Ford’s personal and political influences. These influences led to the creation of a
program that sought to address the issue of amnesty and begin repairing the
social fabric of America, while not exacerbating the divisions already rife within
America.
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I. Draft and Military Offenders
Before beginning any examination of President Ford’s clemency
program and his attempt to reconcile the amnesty question, it is important to
look at the individuals in need of amnesty and how their situation affected the
need for amnesty. Although the groups seeking amnesty were divided into draft
offenders and military offenders, neither group is as homogenous as they were
portrayed. The draft and military offenders of the Vietnam War were comprised
of many different individuals who sought a way out of Vietnam for different
reasons, whether it was personal or in protest to the war. Through an
examination of both groups’ resistance to the war in Vietnam the popular
perceptions of draft and military offenders are seen as faulty, providing a clear
picture of individuals who were faced with moral dilemmas regarding their
participation in the Vietnam War.
Draft offenders were the individuals who refused to go unwillingly to the
war in Vietnam. The American citizenry during the Vietnam era (1964-1973)
was divided on their opinion of draft offenders. To their detractors, draft
offenders were viewed as “common criminals, perhaps even traitors, who broke
the law and must pay the price”. On the other hand, their supporters viewed draft
offenders as “the real heroes of Vietnam, men whose moral stand hastened the
end of a disastrous national mistake and who thus deserve gratitude rather than
punishment.”2 This idea of draft offenders was propagated by the media and
publics focus on the exiles, portraying them as either bright and principled anti-
2 “Next, A Vietnam Amnesty,” Newsweek, vol. 84, Sept. 16, 1974, 27.
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warriors or overeducated cowards.3 The media and public perception of draft
offenders, however, was not accurate. Draft offenders were made up of three
groups: exiles, avoiders and resisters.
Prior to exploring characteristics of each group of draft offenders, their
commonalities must be recognized. Firstly, whether the draft offender was an
exile, avoider or resister, they were all connected. Each one of the offenders had
to consider all options available to them and in the end may have fit in to more
than one grouping. Resisters who became fugitives may have sought exile and
avoiders who failed to receive a deferment through Selective Service
classification may have chose resistance or exile as their next step. Although
each group is different in the defiance of the draft laws, they were not
independent of each other.
Secondly, and most importantly, all three groups of draft offenders had
the same ultimate goal, defiance of the Selective Service System. The Selective
Service System has featured intermittently in American history (enacted during
the Civil War and World War I but ended with the wars) until 1940 when the
American draft laws were established. The draft law led to the Congressional
declaration that “in a free society the obligations and privileges of military
training and service should be shared generally.”4 The obligations and privileges
of military service, however, were not shared generally. By the time of the
Vietnam War, the Selective Service System functioned through local draft
3 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 167.
4 George Q. Flynn, “Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75,” Journal of
Contemporary History 33, no. 1 (Jan. 1998), http://www.jstor.org/stable/260994.
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boards staffed by civilian volunteers that offered deferments to students, fathers
and scientists.5 As opposed to embracing the ideals of equality and universality
of service, the Selective Service System accommodated special interest and
manpower needs through a system of deferment biased against lower class,
lesser educated individuals. It was this ‘corrupt’ system of servitude that exiles,
avoiders and resisters chose to defy.
Exiles, as seen previously, were the individuals responsible for creating
the image of draft offenders as well educated radicals who were keenly antiwar.
These individuals were the ones who decided to flee to Canada or Sweden to
avoid military service during the Vietnam War. Canada and Sweden comprised
the only two realistic choices for exiles wanting to settle down and begin anew.
Canada was attractive for a variety of reasons including freedom from American
social pressures, the ability to obtain citizenship, work permits, and welfare
benefits. Most importantly, however, it was a viable option because Canada at
the time did not consider absence without leave (AWOL) a criminal offense
relieving the fear of extradition, it was familiar to Americans and was easily
accessible; Canada and the United States have the longest friendly border in the
world.6
Sweden was the other realistic option because, like Canada, it offered
wide-open outdoors and had very generous social services and welfare benefits.
Most importantly, Sweden did not view American exiles as immigrants; instead
5 Flynn, “Conscription and Equity,” Journal of Contemporary History,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260994.
6 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 175.
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they were seen as political refugees with international status as opponents of
American war policies.7 Life in Sweden, however, was far more difficult to
adapt to because of their foreign culture. The daily needs of exiles could be
satisfied by speaking English, however, a command of the Swedish language
was essential for all but the most basic jobs.8
Avoiders were draft offenders who sought undeserved deferments to
avoid being drafted and inducted into the armed forces. Although many
individuals chose to alter their lives to obtain deferments, such as attending
college to receive a 2-S classification (Student deferment, granted only upon
application to continuing college students), seeking employment in war industry
occupation to receive a 2-B classification (registrant deferred because of
occupation in war industry) or early on in the war getting married or having
children to receive a deferment; these were legal measures to avoid military
service that did not deceive draft boards.
Directing individuals towards obtaining Selective Service classifications
to avoid war service was a purpose of the Selective Service System. On 1 July
1965 the National Office of the Selective Service System released “Channeling”
as part of the Selective Service Orientation Kit. “Channeling” was an article that
explained the alternative purpose of the Selective Service System, aside from
inducting eligible males into the military. The Selective Service System
describes the function of channelling as a “counterpart and amplification of the
System’s responsibility to deliver manpower to the armed forces in such a
7 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 177.
8 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 177.
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manner as to reduce to a minimum any adverse effect upon the national health,
safety, interest and progress.”9 Basically, the purpose of the Selective Service
System was to meet manpower needs of the military without jeopardizing the
national strength of the United States by drafting individuals that would play a
central role in the functioning of America.
By providing deferments for individuals seeking a way out of military
service, the Selective Service System directed young Americans to occupations
or professions that would benefit the nation. The Selective Service System
believed that “many young men would not have pursued a higher education if
there had not been a program of student deferment. Many young scientists,
engineers, tool and die makers, and other possessors of scarce skills would not
remain in their jobs in the defense effort if it were not for a program of
occupational deferment.”10 The process of channelling allowed the Selective
Service System to meet the manpower needs of the military, while ensuring
national health, interest, safety and progress.
As opposed to succumbing to the Selective Service System’s attempt to
channel individuals through deferments, other individuals like Gerald E.
Schwartz and Paul Herzon, chose to deceive their draft boards to receive a 4-F
classification (Registrant not qualified for any military service). In 1972, while
travelling in Israel, Gerald E. Schwartz received his notice to report to Camp
9 National Office of the Selective Service System. “Channeling,” in Draftees or Volunteers: A
Documentary History of the Debate Over Military Conscription in the United States, 1787-1973,
ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York: Garland Publishing, 1975), 494.
10 National Office of the Selective Service System. “Channeling,” in Draftees or Volunteers: A
Documentary History of the Debate Over Military Conscription in the United States, 1787-1973,
ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York: Garland Publishing, 1975), 494.
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Darby in Livorno, Italy. Knowing this was now a life or death situation,
Schwartz resolved to make him “as repulsive to these people as possible. For
two weeks prior to this interview, [he] didn’t bathe or groom in any way, shape
or form.”11 After passing the physical, Schwartz recalled that he “took on the
persona of a crazy person, because I had no reason to hold back at that point…I
began to do things like suddenly looking up at things that weren’t there, or [swat
at my nose], funny gestures and tics”. Schwartz even went as far as grabbing his
genitals and hiding from the doctor’s pencil, what Schwartz declared to be a
“sterility device.”12 Schwartz’s actions led to his receiving a 4-F classification
and freedom from induction during the Vietnam Era.
 Paul Herzon, similar to Schwartz received a 4-F classification, but not
because he deserved it. Herzon’s father and other doctors distorted his medical
records by backdating remarks to make his charts consistent with “what a truly
asthmatic patient would have in early years.”13 Herzon believed that Vietnam
was “a terrible war…a disaster of monumental proportions” and did not stop
resisting the war after receiving his 4-F classification. Instead, with the help of
his father, Herzon assisted others in evading the draft.
Although individuals like Schwartz and Herzon used fraudulent means to
obtain Selective Service classifications that exempted them from military
service during the Vietnam War, like other avoiders, they ‘legally’ avoided the
draft. Their ‘legal’ avoidance of the draft means that they beat the draft by using
11 Sherry Gershon Gottlieb, Hell No We Won’t Go: Resisting the Draft During the Vietnam War
(New York: Viking, 1991), 26.
12 Gottlieb, Hell No We Won’t Go, 26-27.
13 Gottlieb, Hell No We Won’t Go,, 169.
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its system against it, and therefore were not fugitives or exiles. This had
implications on their participation in the quest for amnesty, because their status
as Americans would not be affected by a granting of amnesty. Avoiders,
however, are important with regards to the question of amnesty because their
actions play a prominent role in an argument in support of amnesty for other
draft and military offenders that will be discussed later.
As draft offenders, resisters were the individuals who realized that the
hazards of joining the army outweighed the hazards of doing everything
imaginable to avoid it and chose to defy the draft laws through a system of non-
violent and sometimes violent acts of protest. The National Resistance, led by
prominent figures such as Dr. Benjamin Spock and Rev. William Sloane Coffin,
published “A Call To Resist Illegitimate Authority” on October 7, 1967
declaring that “every free man has a legal right and a moral duty to exert every
effort to end this war, to avoid collusion with it, and to encourage others to do
the same.”14 Thus began a national movement of draft resistance that led to
young Americans burning their draft cards, abandoning deferments obtained
through Selective Service classifications, and a general strike against the draft
system.
Draft card burning was often a dramatic spectacle which caught the
attention of the press and public and showed the willingness of young
Americans to break the law in their resistance of the Selective Service System
and the war in Vietnam. Many individuals, however, did not want to participate
14 “A Call To Resist Illegitimate Authority,” in Draftees or Volunteers: A Documentary History
of the Debate Over Military Conscription in the United States, 1787-1973, ed. John Whiteclay
Chambers II (New York: Garland Publishing, 1975),476.
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in open resistance to the draft laws and chose less public means to resist. Non-
registration was another popular means to resist the draft, and according to the
article “Check Out The Odds”, for many “not registering is the single most
effective method of dealing with the draft.” It was considered effective because
“the Selective Service has no effective method of tracking down 18-year-olds
who don’t sign up” and because discovery of non-registrants “does not always
mean that you will be prosecuted…you can always register late.”15 As the war
escalated, however, the draft seemed invulnerable to non-violent resistance,
leading towards more daring and violent forms of resistance.
An excellent example of the shift towards violent resistance of the
Selective Service System was the actions of the “Catonsville 9”. On May 17,
1968, a group led by brothers Daniel and Phillip Berrigan entered the Selective
Service offices in Catonsville, Maryland, removed several hundred draft files
and burned them with homemade napalm.16 Although violent protest was a part
of draft resistance, it was not the mainstay. Regardless of whether or not a
resister chose violent or non-violent means to protest the draft and war in
Vietnam, their options after becoming resisters were limited.
Individuals who chose to resist the Selective Service System, publicly or
privately, faced prosecution for draft violations and had one of three options;
live “underground” in the United States, become an exile by fleeing to another
country or face the consequences at home and serve time in prison. They had to
15 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 85.
16 Fire and Faith: The Catonsville Nine File, Enoch Pratt Free Library,
http://c9.mdch.org/index.cfm.
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face the difficult decision of doing the fighting and dying, or suffering the
consequences for their opposition to the war and their refusal to fight.
Draft offenders were a diverse group of individuals that chose to defy the
Selective Service System in an attempt to avoid military service in Vietnam
while protesting the war. As a group, draft offenders did not accurately represent
the public’s impressions. Instead of being the principled, over-educated anti-
warriors who staunchly opposed the war, the overwhelming majority came from
underprivileged backgrounds. According to Baskir and Strauss’ study of
Vietnam-era offenders almost half were “members of a minority group who
never registered for the draft. Three-quarters of the ‘deserters’ were high-school
dropouts, and less than 1 percent ever graduated from college” and instead of
being motivated by opposition to the war “most offenses were motivated
primarily by personal or family problems.”17 Not quite the upper class, college
educated, antiwar activists perceived by the public.
One explanation for the over-representation of lower middle/working
class individuals in the group of draft offenders is the Selective Service
System’s use of “Channeling”. This policy protected the rich through a
“complicated maze of avoidance exemptions” while the poor were “rejected
initially because they did not fit into the perceived manpower needs of the
modern military”. Lower middle/working class individuals as a group, on the
other hand, were “sufficiently skilled and political[ly] dispensable to be
17 Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam: A Program of Relief
for Vietnam Era Draft and Military Offenders (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1977), 2.
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channelled into the military.”18 The Selective Service System combined with the
lack of influence the lower middle/working classes possessed forced them to
bear the brunt of service during the Vietnam War.
Draft offenders were not what the press portrayed them as, nor what the
public believed them to be; they were a diverse mixture of American youth.
Baskir and Strauss, through their findings in Chance and Circumstance: The
Draft, The War and The Vietnam Generation (1978) provide an excellent
summarization of draft offenders as a whole:
Exiles and other fugitives were neither the best nor the worst of
their generation. They were a cross-section of young men who,
for a variety of reasons, refused to submit to the draft or the
dictates of the armed forces. They were rich and poor, black and
white, college graduates and high school dropouts. Some were
related to influential people; both Morris Udall and Spiro Agnew
had nephews living in exile. Some adjusted very well to life as
immigrants, but most did not.19
Similar to draft offenders being portrayed as exiles, a myth of military
offenders as deserters was propagated by the media and perpetuated by the
public’s acceptance of their portrayal. Military offenders were depicted as
cowardly deserters who fled during combat situations. To many this was
considered a “crime against one’s country, a crime against citizenship and a
crime against fellow servicemen”, representing military offenders as the lowest
form of individual.20 This myth, however, was not a factual description of
18 David Sterling Surrey, Choice of Conscience: Vietnam Era Military and Draft Resisters in
Canada (New York: Praeger, 1982), 40.
19 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 168.
20 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 109.
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military offenders, who, in fact, were a diverse group of individuals whose
perspectives on military service changed because of a variety of reasons.
Although 12,000 individuals either deserted during a Vietnam tour or
deserted when they received orders to report to a combat zone, they only made
up a small proportion of the hundreds of thousands of military offenders during
the Vietnam era. In total, 100,000 individuals were discharged for absence
offences (including desertion) and 463,000 individuals received less-than-
honourable discharges for other offenses.21 The small proportion of individuals
guilty of desertion is dwarfed by those who committed other offenses, yet the
media and public viewed military offenders as deserters.
To others, deserters were individuals who started out doing the
honourable thing by serving their country but eventually changed their position
on participation in Vietnam. Senator Ernest Gruening believed that deserters
were committed to the military effort in Southeast Asia until they saw “the
burning of women and children with napalm, the saturation bombing which
destroyed homes, hospitals, and whole families, making homeless refugees of
those that were not killed, turned loose in a defoliated and craterized wasteland”
and could no longer participate in the butchery, so they deserted.22 Others, like
Mark Gilman, were faced with the death of a fellow servicemen and friend and
began to believe that there was “no good reason why he should die, why I
should die, why any GIs should die in Vietnam.”23 Some of the military
offenders charged with absence offenses were late-blooming conscientious
21 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 114.
22 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 112.
23 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 111.
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objectors who failed to properly gauge their opposition to the Vietnam War until
they were confronted with orders to report and others were motivated by a
fear.24 Regardless of the reason, military offenders were not just cowards who
fled from combat to save their own skin; in fact, the majority of military
offenders charged with desertion, did so upon returning to the United States
after completing a tour in Vietnam.
Aside from 100,000 military offenders who committed absence offenses,
there were close to 500,000 individuals who received less-than-honourable
discharges for their service during the Vietnam Era. For these individuals, the
military crisis that arose because of manpower policies that relied heavily on
unsuitable candidates, social turmoil in civilian society, strains caused by the
war and the failure of military leaders to reach an equilibrium between
permissiveness and uncompromising discipline, led to their receiving of
General, Undesirable, Bad Conduct or Dishonourable discharges.25 As opposed
to the popular myth of military offenders as deserters, individuals received less-
than-honourable discharges for a variety of reasons, including financial or
family troubles, earlier misconduct, inability to adjust to military life, romantic
involvements and family pressure.26 In short, they were individuals who decided
to place their own interests above the needs of the American military.
Most military offenders were poorly educated teenagers from
disadvantaged backgrounds who could not adjust to the rigorous demands of
military life. They were individuals confused about their future, individuals who
24 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 113.
25 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 110.
26 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 116.
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had been in trouble with the law during civilian life and individuals who had
difficulty coping with life away from home. According to Baskir and Strauss, in
their work Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War and The Vietnam
Generation (1978), the prototype of a deserter was an individual who:
lived in a small town and grew up in the South. He came from a
low-income family, often with only one parent in the home. He
had an IQ of 90, and dropped out of high school in the tenth
grade. He enlisted to get away from problems back home, to
learn a skill or just to find something to do. He finished advanced
training and had almost two years “good time,” which often
included a full tour in Vietnam. However, he rarely progressed
beyond the lowest ranks. He was arrested at least once by civilian
police, and he frequently committed other minor infractions
against military discipline. After going AWOL once or twice, he
went home to stay, usually because of family problems. Two
years later, he was arrested and given an undesirable discharge in
lieu of court-martial.27
As opposed to fleeing because of fear in a combat situation or because of the
feelings regarding the war, individuals who became military offenders during
the Vietnam era, were most commonly underprivileged young Americans who
shirked their military duties to deal with personal or family problems that arose
prior to or during military service.
The myth that military offenders were individuals that deserted during
combat situations in Vietnam is clearly false. Although some military offenders
were guilty of this, the number of military offenders charged with other absence
offenses or given a less-than-honourable discharge for other violations of
military discipline vastly outnumbers deserters. Military offenders were
individuals who faced a moral dilemma when tasked with committing oneself to
the American military intervention in Vietnam. Whether the dilemma arose
27 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 120.
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because of personal or family issues or an individual’s perspective on the war,
their decisions to place their own problems above the needs of the military led to
their transition into military offenders.
The actions of draft and military offenders, combined with that of the
antiwar movement, increased opposition to the war in Vietnam and may have
helped bring American intervention to a premature close. Regardless of the
benefits, their actions stretched beyond the boundaries of legality and led to their
prosecution or status as fugitives. To many Americans, the benefits of draft and
military offenders’ actions outweighed the fact that they broke the law in
resisting the war. These individuals called for an amnesty for draft and military
offenders that would free them from their fugitive status and allow them to
return from the “underground”, exile or prison to help re-build America in the
post-Vietnam era. To other Americans the fact that actions of draft and military
offenders may have been beneficial was irrelevant. They shirked their duties and
must now face the consequences; to them, amnesty was a travesty.
This division among Americans on the fate of draft and military
offenders and whether or not they were deserving of amnesty exacerbated the
situation in America, and had the potential to damage attempts to rebuild
America in the post-Vietnam era. With the end of the war in sight, Americans
began to wonder; what should become of the draft and military offenders of the
Vietnam era? Should amnesty be granted? These questions and attempts to
answer them influenced President Ford in considering a form of amnesty for
draft and military offenders and his eventual creation of the clemency program.
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II. Amnesty
The earliest and best document case of amnesty occurred in Athens in
403 B.C. In 404 B.C. an oligarchical group of leaders from the wealthiest
classes and the military consolidated its control of the Athens’ government. The
oligarch dealt harshly with political opposition and restricted political
participation to the highest classes. The democrats who opposed the new
government led by the oligarch fled and began a civil war against the new
leaders of Athens. The government’s military campaigns were unsuccessful
against the rebels and support for the government at home was dwindling. The
oligarch ruling Athens was then replaced by a group committed to ending the
struggle, a group upon which an amnesty was offered by the democratic rebels.
The amnesty was accepted by both sides because of their desire to end fighting
and belief that the Athenian community was more important.28
The Athenian amnesty is important because it provides an excellent
example of the amnesty concept. Amnesty was successful because of a mood of
reconciliation among Athenians and encouraged by the new leaders.
Furthermore, it erased the previous political events by declaring them legally
forgotten. And for those unable to forget, provisions were made allowing them
to emigrate.
This concept of amnesty by the Greeks is a clear one. Derived from the
Greek term meaning “forgetfulness” or “oblivion”, amnesty is an act of
28 Alfonso J. Damico, Democracy and the Case for Amnesty (Gainesville: University Presses of
Florida, 1975), 24-26. For a complete historical study of the Athenian amnesty see; Alfred P.
Dorjahn, Political Forgiveness in Old Athens: The Amnesty of 403 B.C. (Evanston:
Northwestern University, 1946).
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“forgetting” rather than “forgiving”. The power to grant amnesty is provided to
the President by Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution which states that “he
shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment.”29
The President has the power to grant pardons and amnesty. According to
the United States Constitution a pardon is “an act of grace, proceeding from the
power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed, from punishment so far as such release is practicable, and
within the control of pardoning power.”30 On the other hand, amnesty is “an act
of sovereign power granting general pardon for a past offense…[and] is usually
extended in behalf of certain classes of persons who are subject to trial, but who
have not been convicted”. There are two types of amnesty commonly
recognized; general amnesty which covers all classes of offenders and particular
amnesty which is limited to special groups. Furthermore, an amnesty can also be
absolute, which imposes no conditions or conditional, which demands a
performance of certain conditions before entering into effect.31
Throughout American history there have been grants of clemency for
certain groups, providing a wide range of examples of the different types of
amnesty and pardon available to the President. The first case of a President
granting a pardon came in 1795, in response to the “Whiskey Insurrection”, in
which several hundred Pennsylvanians burned the home of the regional tax
29 “United States Constitution,” Cornell University Law School,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articleii.html#section2.




inspector and committed other disorders because of their outrage at the levy of a
tax on the distillation of whiskey.32 President George Washington granted a “full
and entire pardon of all persons…of all treasons…and other indictable offenses
against the United States.”33 The pardon, however, did not apply to individuals
who refused or neglected to provide assurances of their future submission to the
laws of the United States or to those who violated these assurances. This
provides an example of a conditional pardon where the crimes were not
forgotten but forgiven after offenders assured the government that they would
submit to the laws of the United States in the future.
President Abraham Lincoln’s proclamations of March 10 and December
8, 1863 provide an excellent example of pardons and amnesty for military
desertion. President Lincoln extended pardon and amnesty to Union and
Confederate deserters provided they swore and adhered to an oath of loyalty to
the United States. Lincoln, however, excluded civil and military prisoners, but
allowed them to petition for clemency individually.34 This provides an example
of a particular pardon geared towards non-civil and military deserters in prison,
but allows those excluded to seek clemency as individuals.
One final example of the power to grant pardons and amnesty of the
President of the United States is President Harry Truman’s amnesty of 1946. By
Executive Order, President Truman created a review board that examined and
considered cases of individuals convicted of violations against the Selective





task and examined and evaluated the cases of 15, 805 draft evaders (deserters
were not eligible) and determined whether or not clemency should be granted.
After consideration, 1,523 individuals were recommended for pardons and on
December 23, 1947, President Truman granted these men a Christmas pardon.35
Each person received an individual pardon, so President Truman’s actions can
not be considered a blanket amnesty.
After considering the definition of amnesty, its earliest application, the
concept of amnesty and pardon according the United States Constitution and
previous examples of the granting of clemency by United States Presidents, the
question of amnesty for draft and military offenders becomes a difficult one.
Although examples of the intended use of amnesty was provided through the
Athenian amnesty, definitions within the United States Constitution and
previous examples show the way the application of amnesty and pardon varies
with the situation. Previous amnesties in United States history provide
reconciliation between individuals who violated the laws of the United States
and the country. The Vietnam era, however, provided a different set of
circumstances making the resolution of the amnesty issue more difficult.
The Vietnam War was not like other wars in United States history. It
failed to garner the widespread public support that World War I and World War
II received. The growing antiwar movement in opposition to American
intervention in Vietnam split the nation into those who opposed and supported
the war effort. The division within America changed the granting of pardons or
amnesty from an attempt to reconcile draft and military offenders with their
35 Ibid, 228.
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nation, to an attempt to reconcile the whole nation by putting the trials and
tribulations of the Vietnam War in the past. Any amnesty granted in the post-
Vietnam era needed to address the needs of draft and military offenders and help
America get past the divisiveness of the Vietnam War and strengthen the United
States. This left President Ford with a monumental task of appeasing the draft
and military offenders and their supporters as well as those who opposed any
form of comfort to the individuals who turn their back on their country. To
complete this task, President Ford established his clemency program for draft
and military offenders to reconcile the nation and heal the wounds of Vietnam.
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III. President Ford’s Clemency Program
On 16 September 1974, in an attempt to address the question of amnesty
and begin rebuilding America in the post-Vietnam era, President Ford issued a
proclamation extending clemency to draft and military offenders.  In his
proclamation, Ford announced:
In furtherance of our national commitment to justice and mercy
those young Americans should have the chance to contribute a
share to the rebuilding of peace among ourselves and with all
nations. They should be allowed the opportunity to earn return to
their country, their communities, and their families, upon their
agreement to a period of alternate service in the national interest,
together with an acknowledgement of their allegiance to the
country and it’s Constitution.
Desertion in time of war is a major, serious offense; failure to
respond to the country’s call for duty is also a serious offense.
Reconciliation among our people does not require that these acts
be condoned. Yet, reconciliation calls for an act of mercy to bind
the nation’s wounds and to heal the scars of divisiveness.
Now, therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States,
pursuant to my powers under article II, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the
Constitution, do hereby proclaim a program to commence
immediately to afford reconciliation to Vietnam-era draft evaders
and military deserters.36
Ford’s clemency program covered four categories of persons; fugitive
draft offenders, fugitive military absence offenders, convicted draft offenders,
and former servicemen with bad discharges for unauthorized absence. To be
eligible for clemency, any individual within the four categories had to have
committed their offense between 4 August 1964 (The Tonkin Gulf Resolution)
and 28 March 1973 (last United States forces withdrawn from Vietnam), applied
to the clemency program prior to 31 January 1975 (the end date, however, was
extended to 15 September 1975) and successfully completed the requirements of
36 “Proclamation Extending Clemency,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, September 17,
1974.
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clemency.37 For most of the individuals, the requirements were an oath of
allegiance to the United States and alternate service.
The oath of allegiance was a problem for draft and military offenders
who desired clemency as a means to return to the United States to visit family
and friends, but wished to continue the new life they created in exile in Sweden
or Canada. For many of the exiles wished to continue their new lives and sought
Canadian or Swedish citizenship, swearing an oath of allegiance to the United
States “cast into doubt their allegiance to Canada or Sweden, jeopardizing their
rights as immigrants.”38
Alternate service, which was any service that contributed to the national
health, safety or interest, was also a sticking point for draft and military
offenders seeking clemency. Many felt they had been punished enough through
less-than-honourable discharges (impediments to employment and veteran’s
benefits), self-imposed exile and their fugitive status and believed that they did
not deserve more punishment for their actions. Furthermore, many draft and
military offenders believed that their actions were right, while the government’s
was wrong, making any form of service unacceptable because they should not
be punished for being right. A final issue with alternate service was that it was
administered by the Selective Service system. Individuals needed to get their
alternate service approved and if they could not find suitable work, Selective
Service was supposed to assist in this regard. Selective Service, however, was
reluctant to assist draft and military offenders in finding alternate service in an
37 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation after Vietnam, 28 & Cynthia Gorney, “Clemency Program
to End Sept. 15,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, August 13, 1975.
38 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation after Vietnam, 32.
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attempt to gain clemency because of hard feelings towards the individuals who
subverted the Selective Service System.
Fugitive draft offenders were individuals who “unlawfully failed under
the military Selective Service Act…to register or register on time, to keep the
local board of his current address, to report for or submit to preinduction or
induction examination…induction itself…or complete service under section 6(J)
of such act.”39 Fugitive draft offenders, under jurisdiction of the Justice
Department, needed to present themselves to a United States attorney before the
program deadline in order to be eligible for clemency. In order to receive
clemency, they had to “execute an agreement acknowledging [their] allegiance
to the United States and pledg[e] to fulfill a period of alternative service under
the auspices of the director of Selective Service, and satisfactorily complete such
service.”40
Not all fugitive draft offenders were eligible for President Ford’s
clemency program. There were two types of fugitive draft offenders not eligible,
individuals not allowed re-entry into the United States under § U.S.C. 1182 (A)
(22), on criminal or related grounds, which includes conviction of a crime
related to moral turpitude or controlled substances and individuals who had
other criminal charges outstanding, their participation in the program would
39 “Proclamation Extending Clemency,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, September 17,
1974.
40 “Proclamation Extending Clemency,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, September 17,
1974.
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have been condition upon or postponed until after final disposition of the other
charges has been reached in accordance with the law.41
Fugitive military absence offenders were individuals who were
administratively classified as deserters by reason of unauthorized absence. They
could report to any military base, from which they were sent to the Joint
Clemency Processing Center near Indianapolis where they would immediately
receive an undesirable discharge and given the chance to earn a clemency
discharge.42 Fugitive military offenders would be relieved of “prosecution and
punishment under Articles 85, 86 and 87 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice” if he takes “an oath of allegiance to the United States and executes an
agreement…pledging to fulfill a period of alternate service.”43 This arrangement
to swear an oath of allegiance and complete alternate service would change the
undesirable discharge into a clemency discharge, which was considered to be
under other-than honourable conditions, without entitlement to veterans’
benefits.44
For fugitive military absence offenders a clemency discharge was just as
desirable as a less-than-honourable discharge. Both precluded offenders from
receiving veteran’s benefits, benefits which the majority of them earned through
a tour in Vietnam and stigmatized military offenders causing problems in civil
society, especially with regards to employment. In fact, the stigma attached to
41 U.S. Code: Title 8, 1182. Inadmissable Aliens.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode08/usc_sec_08_00001182----000-.html
42 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation after Vietnam, 29.
43 “Proclamation Extending Clemency,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, September 17,
1974.
44 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation after Vietnam, 29.
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clemency discharges was sometimes more severe than less-than-honourable
discharges because military offenders were viewed as the worst kind of
offenders, deserters during combat situations. Clemency discharges, because of
their similarity to less-than-honourable discharges, were not sought by the
majority of fugitive military absence offenders. Instead, taking advantage of a
loophole in the Ford clemency program, offenders would submit to the Joint
Clemency Processing Centre, receive their undesirable discharge and shed their
fugitive status.
Convicted draft offenders and former servicemen with bad discharges for
absence offenses could apply by mail to the Presidential Clemency Board and
have their situation reviewed on a case by case basis. The Presidential Clemency
Board consisted of nine-men whose role was limited to reviewing cases and
making recommendations as to the appropriate actions for each case. In
considering the cases, the Presidential Clemency Board would consider
mitigating factors, such as; “honorable service…an individual may have
rendered prior to his absence, penalties already paid under law, and such other
mitigating factors as may be appropriate to seek equity among those who
participate in the program.”45 Regardless of the findings of the nine-man
Presidential Clemency Board, they did not have the power to implement any of
their recommendations. Their sole responsibility was to review the case, provide
a recommendation and allow the President to decide the fate of convicted draft
offenders and former servicemen with bad discharges for absence offenses.
45 “Proclamation Extending Clemency,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, September 17,
1974.
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In summation, President Ford offered draft and military offenders a
chance at reconciliation through a conditional clemency program. Clemency was
contingent upon swearing an oath of allegiance to the United States and
completing up to twenty-four months of alternate service. Despite the
requirements, individuals could receive immediate undesirable discharges upon
application to the program or were able to receive immediate pardons, as
recommended by the Presidential Clemency Board.
President Ford’s clemency program was an attempt to bind the nation’s
wounds after the Vietnam War and was the result of various influences. In
creating his clemency program, President Ford needed to consider many things,
including, the draft and military offenders in need of amnesty, the different sides
of the amnesty debate, the symbolic nature of the amnesty debate, public
opinion regarding amnesty and reconciliation, and President Ford’s personal and
political influences.
31
IV. The Amnesty Debate
The debate on amnesty for draft and military offenders that came on the
heels of the Vietnam War needed to be considered by President Ford before any
clemency proposal could be formulated. President Ford needed to examine both
sides of the amnesty debate and gauge possible public responses to any form of
clemency. Complicating matters for President Ford was the transformation of
the debate into a battle for symbolic vindication between proponents and
opponents of amnesty. As opposed to seeking reconciliation for the nation
through the support or denial of amnesty, the debate became a way for
proponents and opponents of amnesty to justify their views regarding the
Vietnam War, while delegitimizing the views of the opposite side. The
transformation of the debate was further exacerbated by newspaper coverage
that focused on certain arguments for and against amnesty, which facilitated
attempts by both sides to force an admission of wrongdoing from their
opponents.
A. Unconditional Amnesty
Those in favour of granting unconditional amnesty were seeking a
general and absolute amnesty that would erase the transgressions of draft and
military offenders, while not considering their innocence or guilt. To proponents
of amnesty, conditional amnesty (a popular idea among Vietnam era Americans)
was unacceptable because any form of service or requirement placed
connotations of guilt on draft and military offenders. The National Council of
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Churches in their testimony before the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice on
March 11, 1974 regarding the subject of amnesty declared that “conditional
amnesty is still punishment—punishment which serves no useful purpose. Since
it seeks to conform the dictates of conscience, it would be neither rehabilitative,
nor a deterrent.”46 It is their argument that there is no use punishing individuals
who acted out of conscience because it is not something that can be rehabilitated
or deterred.
The argument that conditional amnesty and its requirement of alternative
service was a punishment led supporters of unconditional amnesty to reject the
idea. Bella Abzug, a Democrat and United States Representative from New
York, was a major supporter of unconditional amnesty for draft and military
offenders. Abzug believed that conditional amnesty would only add to the
suffering of draft and military resisters. In her testimony before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, of
the House Committee on the Judiciary on March 13, 1974, she argued that “the
imposition of any requirements…can be justified only on the theory that these
young men have enjoyed some unfair personal advantage vis-à-vis those who
served in the Vietnam War” and that the men who resisted the war effort have
“paid a huge price…having already suffered the hardships of exile, underground
existence, imprisonment or life as an ex-convict.”47 In her opinion, draft and
46 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted To Vietnam War Draft Evaders?” Congressional
Digest, 53, no. 10 (October 1974), 243.
47 Ibid, 235.
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military offenders should not be punished further through the imposition of
conditions with the granting of amnesty.
Abzug went even further and contended that draft and military offenders
who served prison terms should not be required to perform additional service in
order to qualify for amnesty. Abzug argues that “those who faced self-imposed
exile, those who lived precariously in the underground, those who cannot find
work because of questionable discharges from military service, have suffered
enough,” and questions whether requirements of conditional amnesty are really
service or punishment.48 Kit Rigg, a military offender who sought exile in
Vancouver, Canada, supported this idea. Rigg, in the September 2, 1974 edition
of Newsweek, contends that the punitive approach of conditional amnesty
“means we should admit we did something wrong—and we didn’t. We did
something right. We had a higher duty not to participate in the Vietnam War.”49
Another reason for amnesty supporters’ rejection of conditional amnesty
is the impractical and unfair nature of case-by-case examinations of draft and
military offenders. The National Council of Churches, argued that a “case-by-
case review is impractical if not impossible,” because “who among us is
qualified to probe the conscience of another, to judge motivations when society
asks its young men to forget they have been taught, ‘Thou shalt not kill.”50 The
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, in a position paper presented to the
Congressional Black Caucus on April 4, 1974, argued that case-by-case
48 Ibid, 237.
49 “Outlook for Amnesty,” Newsweek,  Vol. 84, September 2, 1974.
50 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest, 53,  no. 10 (October 1974), 243.
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examinations would “discriminate in favour of the white educated and articulate,
who can communicate a philosophical position about the war to persuade some
tribunal of the depth of their convictions. The black and the poor would not
receive justice by using this process.”51 Both arguments, the impracticality of
judging an individual’s conscience and the biased nature of case-by-case
examinations towards rich, educated, white individuals led supporters of
amnesty to reject the idea of conditional amnesty.
Moving beyond the argument in opposition to conditional amnesty, those
in favour of amnesty for draft and military offenders believed that no one would
be hurt by the granting of amnesty, instead people would benefit. Kermit
Lansner, in his article “Amnesty” printed in Newsweek on April 8, 1974 asked
the question “who would suffer, who would be hurt if amnesty is finally
granted?” and proposed his answer, “I suspect that the answer is no one; no
person, no institution, whatever the current fears.”52 This idea was the overriding
principle behind the case for unconditional amnesty because amnesty would not
cause hurt or suffering, instead it would help reconcile a nation with its lost
children. In support of this reconciliation, proponents of amnesty proposed six
main arguments in favour of the granting of absolute and general amnesty;
illegal war argument, American tradition argument, healing national wounds
argument, legal evasion argument, premature conscience argument and the
making peace with the enemy argument.
51 Ibid, 255.
52 Kermit Lansner, “Amnesty,” Newsweek, Vol. 83, April 8, 1974, 29.
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The illegal war argument is the argument that the individuals who
opposed the war through draft and military resistance acted according to the
dictates of their conscience and therefore acted in an honourable fashion.
Furthermore, their actions contributed to the welfare and character of the United
States by awakening citizens to the dangers of the Vietnam War.53 Two major
components of this argument are the illegality of the war and the unfairness of
the draft.
Proponents of unconditional amnesty argue that the war in Vietnam was
illegal because only congress has the ability to declare war, yet two presidents
widened a conflict that could be considered a full scale war.54 Therefore,
individuals who refused to serve in Vietnam acted honourably by not
perpetrating an illegal war. Since there was no declaration of war by congress,
there is no legal justification for the punishment of draft and military offenders
for defying an illegal action. Kermit Lansner, in his article “Amnesty”
recognizes that “most who argue the case for…unconditional amnesty have
finally decided that the war was unjust, immoral—indeed criminal” and that “the
web of deception and self-deception which marked the American conduct of the
war… led to such offenses as draft resistance and desertion.”55
 This idea that American conduct in the war led to draft and military
offenses is supported by Mike Hendricks of the Montreal Council to Aid War
Resisters, who in 1972 argued that draft and military offenders could not be
“forgiven for taking morally correct stands against immoral/[illegal] acts of our
53 Edward F. Dolan, Jr., Amnesty: The American Puzzle (New York: Franklin Watts, 1976), 53.
54 Dolan, Amnesty, 54.
55 Kermit Lansner, “Amnesty,” Newsweek, Vol. 83, April 8, 1974, 29.
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government.”56 Draft and military offenders were responding to the lack of
morality of the American government by following their consciences in resisting
the war effort. The ability of these offenders to take a moral stand against the
illegal actions of the government supports the granting of amnesty for them
because they acted honourably by following their consciences, not the dictates
of their President.
Similarly, the unfair draft system that provided deferments to the upper-
class and educated placed the burden of service on the lower class and less
educated. Therefore those who refused the draft were not escaping their
responsibility or turning their backs on their country. Instead they were rejecting
an unjust system in the service of an illegal war. Terrence T. DeShone, a
Vietnam veteran argued in a February 24, 1973 editorial in The Washington Post
that “before the lottery selection the draft was biased against non-fathers, non-
students, non-professional/managerial men and the non handicapped” and that
there was “good reason to grant total amnesty.”57 The Selective Service System,
which has already been discussed, was biased towards the drafting of lower
middle/working classes because they had the required skills and were politically
expendable. The biased operational nature of the draft system requires the
granting of amnesty.
In the editorial “Amnesty and Loyalty” printed 23 March 1974 in The
Washington Post, Constance E. Sorrentino argued that draft and military
56 Julius Duscha, “Should There be Amnesty for the War Resister,” New York Times, December
24, 1972.
57 Terrence T. DeShone, “Peace with Ourselves,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, February
2, 1973.
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offenders, “the men who refused to fight in Vietnam by going into exile, going
underground, or going to jail did not escape their responsibility, in fact, she
believes they “accepted their responsibility of following their consciences in
refusing to commit the violence of Vietnam.”58 Sorrentino, along with other
advocates of amnesty, argued that individuals who did not submit to the draft to
complete their obligations to the United States completed their obligations to the
consciences by scorning an illegal war facilitated by a corrupt draft system. The
ability of draft and military offenders to refrain from submitting to an unfair
draft system and participating in an illegal and immoral war made them
deserving of amnesty because they displayed morality in a time when others
discarded theirs.
Draft and military offenders’ actions to avoid the war in Vietnam were
also applauded by some Vietnam Veterans throughout the debate period.
Charles Skillom, a Vietnam Veteran, stated in 1972 that he believed that “people
who want to fight should fight and those who don’t should have to” and that if
draft and military offenders could “get away with not going, more power to
them”. In the end, proposed Skillom, “it’s your conscience that is going to deal
with you any way.”59 Another Vietnam Veteran, Darryl Cleaton, revealed in
1974 that he “joined up in 1970 because [he] wanted to go to Vietnam, but a lot
of guys didn’t want to join and I don’t think they should have been forced to
58 Constance E. Sorrentino, “Amnesty and Loyalty,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, March
23, 1974.
59 Jeannye Thornton, “Mini’pinions,” Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1972.
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go…so I don’t see it as unfair.”60 Both Skillom and Cleaton believed that the
choice to participate in the Vietnam War was up to the individual, they both
chose to go and got their wish, others who decided not to participate should not
be punished for making the choice.
Another argument used by advocates in support of unconditional
amnesty is the tradition of amnesty in American history. Bella Abzug, in her
testimony before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, of the House Committee on the Judiciary on March
13, 1974, acknowledged that “since our earliest history, this government has
granted amnesty after wars and rebellions at home and abroad. From the Shays
and Whiskey Rebellions, through the war of 1812, the Civil War and the First
and Second World Wars, the cessation of hostilities has generally been followed
by one or another form of amnesty.”61 Historically, there have been thirty-four
cases of amnesty in American history, setting a legal precedent for amnesty
during the Vietnam Era.
The examples of amnesty within American history, however, vary from
full pardons to conditional amnesty. President Washington, in response to the
Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, pardoned those convicted who agreed to thereafter
obey the law.62 This example was not amnesty because those tried and convicted
of a crime received a pardon, but this type of action could apply to draft and
60 Ronald Yates, “Many Viet Nam Veterans Favor Granting Amnesty,” Chicago Tribune, March
17, 1974.
61 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest, 53, no. 10 (October 1974), 235.
62 Allan C. Brownfield, “Will Amnesty Serve Justice?” Human Events, Vol. 33, no. 43, (Oct. 27,
1973). 21.
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military offenders serving prison sentences or time in the stockade. Another
example, President Lincoln’s decision to grant an unconditional amnesty to
Civil War deserters who returned to their posts is different from the
unconditional amnesty sought by advocates, but was still applicable with regards
to their argument.63
Although there has not been a case of amnesty in American history that
would mirror the one advocates were calling for, historical precedents supported
the granting of amnesty. To battle the lack of exact precedent, advocates of
amnesty argued that the lack of an exact historical precedent should not dissuade
the President from setting a new one. When Lincoln decided to grant amnesty to
deserters during the Civil War, he did not have historical precedents to call
upon, instead he set the precedent with his actions. President Ford, argued
advocates of amnesty, could do the same by providing unconditional amnesty to
draft and military offenders of the Vietnam Era.
Healing the national wounds caused by the war in Vietnam, was perhaps
the most important argument used in support of unconditional amnesty.
Undoubtedly, the Vietnam War created a divide in America between those who
supported the war effort and those who did not, a divide which carried over into
the amnesty debate. Any attempt to address the amnesty issue in the United
States, according to advocates, needed to be guided by the primary purpose of
amnesty, “reconciliation, the binding up of the country’s wounds of war.”64
63 Allan C. Brownfield, “Will Amnesty Serve Justice?” Human Events, Vol. 33, no. 43 (Oct. 27,
1974), 21.
64 “Time to Bind up the Wounds,” America, Vol. 131 (Sept. 7, 1974), 83.
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Amnesty would be the first stop towards healing and reconciliation within
America.
According to the National Council of Churches in their testimony before
the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice on March 11, 1974, amnesty “is granted not
because the government agrees with the political and moral positions of those
affected, but because it is in the national interest. It is forgetting. Not
forgiving.”65 David Hackworth, a highly decorated military colonel and
prominent military journalist, understands this need to forget, recognizing that
the amnesty debate “reminds Americans of the Viet Nam
nightmare…reawaken[ing] the pain, guilt, and shame that we want so badly to
forget” and that the healing can only begin when the amnesty issue “is wisely
put to rest.”66 According to advocates, amnesty should not consider the positions
or correctness of either side of the debate; instead it should help the nation move
forward by erasing the harms caused by the Vietnam War and dealing with the
issue of amnesty.
On another occasion, Abzug weighed in on the need for amnesty, but
went beyond the healing of the national wounds caused by the war and
addressed the need to have draft and military offenders back in the fold to
rebuild America in the post-Vietnam era. Abzug argued that amnesty would heal
“some of the wounds remaining from this immoral war and would enable us – as
65 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest, 53, no. 10 (October 1974), 241.
66 David Hackworth, “A Soldier’s Case for Total Amnesty,” Chicago Tribune, August 4, 1974.
41
a nation – to utilize one of our most valuable resources, the thousands of young
men and women lost” because of draft and military offenses.67
Granting unconditional amnesty, according to its advocates, was the
quickest way to mend the divide within America and strengthen the country. If
granting amnesty would strengthen the country, then to advocates, the exact
opposite would happen without it. The denial of amnesty would lead to further
upheaval of the American social fabric and show the vindictiveness and lack of
compassion of the United States.68 The divisions within America surrounding
the Vietnam War, for proponents of amnesty, could be healed through the
granting of unconditional amnesty for draft and military offenders.
The legal evasion argument posits that it was unfair to single out draft
and military offenders for punishment when many other Americans avoided
service in the Vietnam War through legal means. According to a study
completed by Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss and published in
Congressional Digest in October 1974, 8,769,000 individuals of the Vietnam
generation (individuals aged 19-34 on June 30, 1973) were deferred or exempted
from the draft and legally avoided participation in the Vietnam War. Many of
the deferments or exemptions granted to these individuals would have been
legitimate, but there were also many individuals whose deferments or
exemptions were not.
The young men hiding behind their deferments or playing games with
the draft boards also evaded the draft, the only difference between them and
67 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
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42
draft and military offenders was that draft and military offenders acted honestly
and openly in their opposition to and evasion of the Vietnam War. Draft and
military offenders, because of their open and honest actions regarding the
Vietnam War, argued advocates of amnesty, should not be singled out for
punishment when many used “legal evasion” of the draft to escape both service
in Vietnam and punishment in the United States.
James C. Richardson, a Vietnam veteran, understood that punishment of
draft and military offenders was unfair, while others legally avoided the draft. In
a September 29, 1972 article in The Washington Post, Richardson acknowledged
“the hypocrisy of those who would not give amnesty” for draft and military
resisters while looking “the other direction when fixed tactics allow[ed] people
to commit the moral outrage of ‘legal’ evasion of the draft.”69 This argument is
important because proponents of amnesty understood and promoted the idea that
the actions of draft and military offenders were no different than those
individuals who legally evaded the draft. The only difference was the inability
of draft and military offenders to understand and accept legal means to avoid
service in Vietnam. It would be unfair to punish draft and military offenders,
according to advocates of amnesty, because they were unable or unwilling to use
legal means to evade the draft and military service.
An additional argument proposed by those in favour of unconditional
amnesty was that the only thing draft and military offenders were guilty of was a
premature conscience. Draft and military offenders prematurely opposed and
69 James C. Richardson, “McGovern and Amnesty,” The Washington Post, Times Herald,
September 29, 1972.
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resisted the war in Vietnam, a war that the rest of the country eventually
rejected. Hackworth recognized the premature conscience of war resisters and
their contribution to the changing perception of the war within America;
They saw the war was bad, long before most of us. Their outcry
served as a spearhead that contributed to the public outrage which
finally caused our reluctant government to disentangle our nation
from the quagmire of Viet Nam. Their only crime was to clearly
see that we were wrong – ahead of the rest of us. Their finding
was premature.70
Advocates of amnesty argued that draft and military offenders should not
be punished “for refusing to participate in a war which the American people
condemned many years ago.”71 To advocates of amnesty, draft and military
offenders should not be punished because they were the first to oppose
American involvement in Vietnam and the first to recognize the war as evil.
Instead, draft and military offenders should be provided with unconditional
amnesty for being the conscience of America.
The “making peace with the enemy” argument was the final one used in
support of unconditional amnesty. This argument is related to attempts by the
United States to rebuild relationships with its former war opponents. After major
wars the United States has renewed relationships with Germany, Japan and even
provided assistance to Vietnam through economic stimulation.72 America’s
attempts to forgive and rebuild relationships with its former enemies were a
logical point of reference for advocates of amnesty. Advocates argued that if the
70 David Hackworth, “A Soldier’s Case for Total Amnesty,” Chicago Tribune, August 4, 1974.
71 Diane M. Cleemput, “Turmoil of a Decision,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, February
7, 1973.
72 Alie Schardt, William A. Rusher & Mark O. Hatfield, Amnesty? The Unsettled Question of
Vietnam, Now! Never! If… (Lawrence: Sun River Press, 1973), 5.
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Unites States can “consider assisting the very nation with which we engaged in
combat, resulting in the death of 55,000 of our men, do we not have the
compassion to forgive our own men who are still alive and desire to return to the
United States?”73  Pointing out that the United States had the compassion to
forgive other nations’ transgressions during the course of war, forgiving their
own sons seems a logical step in the rebuilding of the government’s relationship
with the American citizenry.
The idea of making peace with “Moscow, Peking and Hanoi, and not our
own sons,” is one that Henry Schwarzchild, the head of the Project on Amnesty,
sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union, viewed as a “ghastly
tragedy.”74 In addition to this, many advocates felt “it would be bitterly ironic if
we were to make peace with the peoples of China and Southeast Asia but
persisted in vindictiveness toward those of the young generation who refused to
share in the brutalities and destruction of the war.”75 For advocates of amnesty,
the United States’ ability to renew relationships with former enemies and not its
own sons was viewed as unbelievable, but provided a logical line of reasoning
for the extension of reconciliation to draft and military resisters.
B. Amnesty No!
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Those against amnesty strongly opposed leniency, in the form of
amnesty, towards draft and military offenders for actions they viewed as
unforgivable. Similar to the advocates of amnesty, there were also six main
arguments employed by its opponents: the legalism argument, the legal war
argument, the argument against precedents, the argument against premature
morality, the insulting to those who served argument and the substitution
argument. Clearly from the argument titles, it is easy to see that the majority of
the arguments used by opponents of amnesty directly challenge the arguments
used by advocates of amnesty. Opponents, however, also provide broader
arguments that refute the two main components of the arguments used by
advocates of unconditional amnesty, reconciliation and compassion.
The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW), through Col.
Phelps Jones’ testimony before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice, of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
March 8, 1974, argued against reconciliation and compassion, the two major
tenets of the unconditional amnesty argument, in an attempt to discredit the
granting of amnesty. The VFW argued that “to welcome back whatever the
number [of draft and military offenders]…would be more divisive than
healing.”76 Human Events, a conservative periodical, added to the notion that
amnesty would not heal and that a program of reconciliation was not needed
because the United States already has “a system of justice…which considers
76 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
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every case on its individual merits.”77 To opponents of amnesty, specifically the
VFW, a granting of amnesty would further divide the nation and subvert the
justice system already in place to handle draft and military offenders.
With regards to the argument supporting compassion for draft and
military offenders used by advocates of amnesty, the VFW and opponents of
amnesty argued, “Compassion is a very admirable attribute. But the real
question is compassion for whom? For the people who fought the war no matter
what their views might have been, who might have desired a shorter and more
purposeful war, or obviously no war at all?”78 The VFW went further and
provided an example of the compassion that draft and military resisters should
expect;
A young man who spent 5 years in Sweden during the heart of
the Vietnam War, 5 years, 1968 to 1973, was found guilty of
absence without leave, and has been sentenced to 15 months in
the stockade. That, I think, is an incredible sentence in view of
the seriousness of his offense. I think that is an example of the
kindliness and compassion that many of the young people have
every right to expect when they return and face up to their
responsibilities as citizens.79
Clearly, feelings of compassion toward draft and military offenders were non-
existent among opponents of amnesty. Overall, their view of the compassion and
reconciliation called for by advocates of amnesty was stark. To opponents, the
granting of any form of amnesty was “a bit like changing the rules after the
77 Thomas A. Lane, “Amnesty for Draft Dodgers?”, Human Events, Vol. 32, no. 6 (Feb. 5,
1972), 22.
78 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
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game has begun. It doesn’t seem quite fair to the people who didn’t want to
serve, but somehow did.”80
The first main argument in opposition to the granting of amnesty is the
legalism argument. This argument proposes that in a democracy, citizens are
guaranteed the right to oppose laws, but must act within the legal and social
order of the nation. The individual who opposes the law, in this case draft and
military offenders, must be willing to face the consequences of their actions (jail
or less-than-honourable discharge) or choose exile.81 The VFW argued that draft
and military offenders “broke the law, often with very noble and self-serving
statements surrounding that action…it would be in their interest and the interest
of the country to have them face up to American justice.”82
There are two lines of reasoning in support of this argument, the first is
that draft and military offenders need to face the consequences of their actions
and the second is that amnesty would violate the legal and social order of the
United States. Harry Kjus in an editorial in the 23 March 1974 edition of the
Chicago Tribune argued that “most of us learned our lesson when we were kids
and are the better for it” and that the “people who are pleading for amnesty are
the ones who didn’t get their lumps.”83 Opponents of amnesty, including Harry
Kjus, believed that draft and military offenders, like children, should be
disciplined before they can contribute to society.
80 Max A. Coots, “Transcending the Debate,” America, Vol. 130, June 15, 1974.
81 Dolan, Amnesty, 57.
82 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest, Vol. 53, 245.
83 Harry Kjus, “Why Amnesty For Anyone,” The Chicago Tribune, March 23, 1974.
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Granting amnesty, according to opponents, would subvert the justice
system within America and violate the legal and social order of the United
States. To opponents of amnesty, “justice requires the continuing, consistent
administration of the law” in order for every person to receive their due, the
laws can not be discarded for draft and military resisters.84 In order for draft and
military offenders to return to America, opponents of amnesty argued that
“something should be done to punish them. You can’t just break the law and get
away with it. When you run away from responsibility you have to pay for it.”85
Draft and military offenders neglected their responsibility to the draft laws and
their country, and in the opinion of opponents of amnesty, must now face the
consequences of their actions; continued exile, living underground or prison.
Opponents of amnesty, such as the VFW, were not against all draft and
military offenders. The ones that faced the consequences of their actions by
serving a prison sentence were not looked down upon by the VFW and
opponents of amnesty. Col. Phelps Jones of the VFW confessed he had “some
respect for those whose opposition to the war in Vietnam or any earlier war led
them to stand up and be counted and accept a jail sentence. They are
accountable citizens of a free country. Those men have my respect. While I
obviously disagree with the stand they took, they have my respect.”86 For
opponents of amnesty, “loyalty is at the very heart of the controversy” and that
any individual who violates his duty to his country must “accept the label
84 Thomas A. Lane, “Amnesty for Draft Dodgers?” Human Events, Vol. 32 no. 6, 22.
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‘outlaw’” and face the consequences. If draft and military offenders face the
consequences of their actions, they have fulfilled their duties as citizens, in the
eyes of opponents of amnesty, and can participate in American society.
The legal war argument is a response to the notion put forth by advocates
of amnesty that the war in Vietnam was illegal and is fairly straightforward.
Opponents of amnesty, in response to the suggestion that the Vietnam War was
waged illegally, argue that the fact that congress consistently appropriated funds
for the Vietnam War effort legitimized the war, without a formal declaration.87
At its most basic level, this line of reasoning demands that draft and military
resisters “recognize it is they who erred and not the country” and that the nation
must be “unyielding in punishing” draft and military resisters until they have
“admitted that they were wrong.”88
Furthermore, the legal war argument also deals with the issue of the
draft. According to proponents of the legal war argument, the obligation to serve
in the military through the draft was not contingent on a declared war. The
Selective Service System established in 1940 operated during times of peace,
with 1,327,363 men inducted in the years between the Korean and Vietnam
Wars.89 Therefore, opponents of amnesty argued that draft and military resisters
who evaded the draft or deserted after being drafted can not argue against
serving in an illegal war, when their obligations under the Selective Service Act
were not dependent on a declared war.
87 Dolan, Amnesty, 60.
88 Lou Cannon, “Agnew Restates White House’s Amnesty Stance,” The Washington Post, Times
Herald, March 7, 1973.
89 Selective Service, “Induction Statistics,” Selective Service System,
http://www.sss.gov/induct.htm.
50
The argument against precedents has two parts; recognizing that
there is no historical precedent for unconditional amnesty and that
granting unconditional amnesty would create a dangerous precedent for
the future. First, opponents of amnesty, like the VFW, argued that “there
has never been unconditional amnesty for draft dodgers after any war,
from the founding of the Republic through Korea.”90 Opponents of
amnesty conceded that there are precedents for amnesty for draft and
military resisters in American history, but if you read about “Lincoln,
Andrew Johnson and other Presidents…those who deserted either served
in prison or did some type of alternative service on the basis of
individual judgement,” making the amnesties granted in the past
conditional.91 Legal precedents support the granting of conditional
amnesty, amnesty contingent on prison sentences or alternative service.
Secondly, opponents of amnesty applying the argument against
precedents contended that the granting of amnesty for draft and military resisters
would jeopardize future military endeavours of the United States.92 Future
military endeavours would be jeopardized because “general amnesty for past
violations might well convince some young men in the future that they [have]
little to lose by evading military service.”93 Also, amnesty could potentially
“hand to future ‘dissidents’ the power…to denude the armed forces of the
“Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
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United States and to veto the foreign policy decisions of its elected leaders”.94
Among opponents of amnesty there was a fear that setting a precedent of
amnesty during the Vietnam Era would endanger the future military capabilities
of the United States and that is reason enough to deny amnesty for draft and
military resisters.
The argument against premature morality is a response to the argument
in favour of amnesty because draft and military resisters prematurely opposed a
war the country would eventually come to see as evil. Although many have
come to view the Vietnam War as unnecessary or evil, opponents of amnesty
argued that “no man is above the law…a person cannot choose a law to obey”.95
Opponents of amnesty insisted that “anarchy occurs when citizens are
encouraged by amnesty…to select those laws they wish to obey and disobey.”96
Premature morality led draft and military resisters to disobey the law, for
opponents, the granting of amnesty would allow others to disobey laws they felt
were unjust or in need of review.
Furthermore, opponents did not believe that draft and military offenders
were the moral fibre of America. In fact, in their eyes they were the farthest
thing from it because they were criminals. Jones explains the position of
opponents of amnesty with regards to draft and military offenders’ moral
character:
I find it very difficult to accept the notion, cherished by some,
that draft evaders somehow are the moral vessels of the industrial
94 William S. White, “No Amnesty for Draft Resisters,” The Washington Post, Times Herald,
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west, to whom like gurus we should report for moral uplift when
they return to our shores. They are, in fact, lawbreakers.
Assessment of motivation is most difficult. But no matter what
they thought, or no matter what the people who stood and fought
in their place though, they broke the law.97
For opponents of amnesty, viewing draft and military offenders, individuals who
have broken the law and mostly evaded punishment (some served prison
sentences or faced the consequences), were not even eligible to be considered
moral warriors of America.
The most emotional argument used by individuals opposed to amnesty
was that granting amnesty would be an insult to those considered to be missing
in action (MIA), killed in action (KIA), prisoners of war (POWs) and to those
who served honourably in the Vietnam War. Failing to prosecute draft and
military resisters would be an affront to all of those who served in Vietnam.98
The granting of amnesty would be “a slap in the face to the millions of men who
were drafted, who were wounded, who were maimed or who were killed” in the
Vietnam War.99 The VFW recalling the 667,000 war dead in American history,
called amnesty “a studied insult to those that are living today and those that went
before.”100 This line of reasoning went as far as to condemn “those who did
desert, who did flee, [to] rot in hell.”101 All of those who made a sacrifice to
answer the call of their country, whether it was a few years or their life, would
be dishonoured by a granting of amnesty to draft and military resisters.
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Many opponents of amnesty believed that amnesty should be granted by
the President if he can “give back the limbs, eyes and sanity to all the young
American men and women who served in the Vietnam War, if he can restore the
lives lost in that war…only then can he offer leniency to those cowardly and
misguided people.”102 John L. Dorsa, in an editorial in The Washington Post on
23 September 1974 in response to amnesty, asked, “Who will heal the wounds
of the maimed, disfigured, and heart-broken from the war? What will erase the
scars and void left by the death of loved ones who did not shirk their orders and
duties?”103 For opponents of amnesty, any leniency towards draft and military
offenders was considered outrageous because the same comfort and leniency
could not be shown to those who made the sacrifice of participation in the
Vietnam War.
According to this line of reasoning, draft and military offenders turned
their backs on America in a time of need, whereas those who answered the call
made great sacrifices to protect and further America and its policies.104 Some
opponents of amnesty posited that draft and military resisters turned their back
on America and “by their acts have wilfully and perversely given aid and
comfort to our enemies.”105 Furthermore, opponents of amnesty argued that to
“let them return to the country they shunned…is a slap in the face to the millions
of men who were drafted, who were wounded or who were killed in a bloody
102 “Next, A Vietnam Amnesty,” Newsweek, Vol. 84, Sept. 16, 1974, 27.
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unpopular war.”106 Not only did draft and military offenders fail in their
obligations to their country, they made the duties of servicemen harder by aiding
the enemy through their non-participation and resistance. Granting amnesty
would not only welcome back draft and military offenders, but condone their
actions.
The final argument in opposition to the granting of amnesty is that of
substitution. This argument posits that draft and military resisters, through their
actions, led to the drafting of other Americans to serve in Vietnam. By shirking
their duties and obligations as Americans, draft and military resisters put the
burden of the war on other individuals.107 According to William A. Rusher, draft
and military resisters actions led to the wounding of 10,000 and death of 1,500
fellow draftees who, if not for their actions, may not have been drafted.108 Draft
and military resisters, through their active opposition to participation in
Vietnam, distorted the draft system causing men with lower draft classes to be
drafted as a result of their absences. Their actions led to others being “drafted
and sent into combat as their replacements, and possibly wounded, maimed or
killed”, it would not be right to grant amnesty when their actions resulted in the
sacrifices of others.109
C. Conditional Amnesty
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The argument for conditional amnesty, unlike the previous two
discussed, does not have a set of arguments or main tenets to outline. Instead,
the argument for conditional amnesty is a mixture of the arguments in support
and opposed to amnesty in general. Those in favour of conditional amnesty
argued that it would begin the process of healing the nation in the post-Vietnam
period as well ensuring that draft and military offenders were not treated as
individuals who were above the law. Conditional amnesty takes on the best
attributes from both sides of the amnesty debate to create a solution that
amalgamates the two viewpoints without alienating either group.
Senator Robert Taft, Jr. of Ohio, a devoted Republican who had
excellent political pedigree; his grandfather, William Howard Taft was President
of the United States and his father, Robert Alphonso Taft was a United States
Senator, was an advocate of conditional amnesty.  According to Taft, any
discussion of amnesty “directed toward consideration of the plight of such
individuals [draft and military resisters] becomes entangled in emotional debate
as to the propriety of United States military involvement in Southeast Asia.”110
Taft, and other individuals who backed conditional amnesty, saw the need for an
amnesty that addressed the arguments of both sides of the debate because of the
emotional investment of each side into justifying their views. Amnesty should
not be about which side was right, but should instead consider the issue of
establishing the most “practical method whereby an estimated 30,000
110 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
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individuals could return to this country or cease to be fugitives without creating
further divisions among Americans.”111
Divisiveness was a strong motivating factor behind the advocating of
conditional amnesty. For those in favour, blanket amnesty went too far because
such an approach would be “too broad and would include individuals who did
not have deep moral convictions against the war.”112 On the other hand, the
rejection of amnesty was also out of the question because some form of amnesty
was needed to bring “some release from the tightening grip of contentiousness
and self-righteousness – on both sides of the issue – in our country, which might
bring…more brotherhood after all the freely expended hate, contempt and
violence of the last decade.”113
Combining the best attributes of both sides of the amnesty debate,
advocates of conditional amnesty sought to establish an amnesty program
derived from “a toleration of differing viewpoints; rather than from a categorical
demand for agreement with any particular set of moral and political
principles.”114 Instead of arguing that draft and military offenders were right and
deserved amnesty, or were wrong and did not deserve amnesty, proponents of
conditional amnesty sought to bring together the opposing views and create a
program of reconciliation that would be acceptable to both sides and benefit






Drawing on the argument that amnesty would heal the nation proposed
by advocates of unconditional amnesty and the legalism argument proposed by
opponents of amnesty, those in support of conditional amnesty tried to bridge
the divide within America. Supporters acknowledged the need to help reconcile
the nation after the war in Vietnam and supported clemency for draft and
military offenders. Furthermore, they also recognized that draft and military
offenders violated the law and needed to face the consequences for their actions.
To address the needs of both sides of the debate, they combined these two main
arguments and called for clemency for draft and military offenders willing to
earn it.
By requiring alternate service, advocates of conditional amnesty
appeased opponents of amnesty because draft and military offenders had to face
the consequences of avoiding service in the Vietnam War and have not been
vindicated for their opposition to the war. Conversely, by providing earned
amnesty to draft and military offenders, advocates of conditional amnesty
attempted to heal the nation, something sought after by proponents of amnesty,
while giving draft and military offenders an opportunity to become useful
citizens in the rebuilding of America in the post-Vietnam era.
According to United States Representative Frank Horton, a Republican
from New York, another advantage of conditional amnesty was that it provided
a better way to deal with a complicated issue. Horton argued that because of
“the diversity of the people and circumstances involved in the amnesty
question” the only proper way to deal with it would be the case-by-case
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examinations of conditional amnesty because it is the best way of “determining
when repatriation should be granted, and the circumstances under which
criminal prosecution could be waived.”115 The complexity of the issue of draft
and military offenses during the Vietnam era forced a case-by-case
consideration of violations in order to determine the circumstances of an
individual’s offense and how they should be dealt with.
Conditional amnesty was also a popular choice among the American
public. Although most of the focus on the amnesty debate was given to the two
opposing positions, those in support of amnesty and those opposed, the majority
of the public favoured a resolution that required draft and military offenders to
perform some form of alternate service. Gallup polls conducted on 5 March
1973 and 21 April 1974 asked whether those who avoided the draft should be let
back without punishment. Sixty-seven percent of Americans on 5 March 1973
and fifty-eight percent of Americans on 21 April 1974 opposed unconditional
amnesty. Forty-six percent on 5 March 1973 and forty-five percent on 21 April
1974 supported the idea of alternate service for draft offenders.116 This
sentiment goes as far back as 1972, when an August 20th Gallup poll found that
sixty-two percent of Americans would be less likely to vote for a president in
favour of unconditional amnesty.
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V. The Amnesty Debate: Symbolic Vindication
The debate on amnesty was transformed from an opportunity of
reconciliation for the benefit of draft and military offenders, as well as the
country, into a symbolic battle between proponents and opponents of amnesty
for the justification of their viewpoints regarding their actions in response to the
war in Vietnam and their feelings towards the war itself. Both sides saw the
amnesty debate as an opportunity to legitimize their positions on the war and
their response to American intervention in Vietnam. Also, their focus on certain
arguments for and against amnesty extended the debate of the Vietnam War into
the realm of amnesty. Its transformation was exacerbated by newspaper
coverage of the arguments employed by proponents and opponents of amnesty.
Newspaper bias towards focusing on certain arguments helped facilitate the
transformation and elicited strong emotional responses from the public.
The tying of the amnesty debate to the debate on the Vietnam War led to
strong emotional responses from both sides and resulted in the throwing to the
wayside of any consideration of the benefits of amnesty for draft and military
offenders. As opposed to focusing on the benefits of amnesty for draft and
military offenders, proponents of amnesty involved in the antiwar movement
used the debate as a final attempt to force the issue of the morality of the
Vietnam War and individuals reactions in response to it. Those involved in both
the antiwar movement and the amnesty debate were the most outspoken and as a
result received the most coverage of their views in the news media. This led to
the tying of the amnesty debate to the debate on the war in Vietnam.
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Instead of arguing for the benefits of amnesty for draft and military
offenders, these individuals believed that amnesty “is important to the
vindicated war offenders” because they “were right” and “that’s what amnesty is
all about.”117 Furthermore, many believed that amnesty would never occur
because “it could only happen if the American people were willing to admit they
were wrong about the war.”118 Antiwar individuals seeking amnesty or
supporting the granting of amnesty turned the debate into an issue of admitting
guilt. Their focus on the question of who was right or wrong with regards to the
Vietnam War perverted the debate on amnesty and its benefits into a chance to
obtain an admission of guilt from the United States for their involvement in
Vietnam.
Furthermore, the amnesty debate was another way for the antiwar
movement to showcase the true character of the United States. Dr. Willard
Gaylin, an associate professor of psychology at Columbia University School of
Medicine119 believed that a “refusal to declare amnesty would show [a]
vindictiveness and desire to punish.”120 Gerry Condon, managing editor of
Amex, similarly to Dr. Gaylin, believed that “rejecting the concept of
amnesty…extract[s] yet another pound of flesh from those who have
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61
conscientiously resisted an illegal and immoral war.”121 Both Gaylin and
Condon provide examples of how the amnesty debate was changed by antiwar
protestor participation into an opportunity to condemn the character of the
United States. As opposed to focusing on the advantages of amnesty for draft
and military offenders, the issue was morphed into an opportunity to point out
the faults in the United States’ character if amnesty was denied and the
opportunity for the United States to show its true quality through the granting of
amnesty.
The inclusion of antiwar protestors was not the only reason for the
connection between the debates on amnesty and the Vietnam War. The
arguments used by proponents of amnesty, specifically the illegal war and
premature conscience arguments successfully extended the debate on the
Vietnam War into the debate on amnesty. The use of the illegal war argument is
a clear cut example of how the amnesty debate was used as an extension of the
debate on the Vietnam War. A major part of the antiwar movement was
attempting to prove that American involvement in Vietnam was illegal. By using
the legality of the Vietnam War as a basis for amnesty, in the eyes of the antiwar
movement and draft and military offenders, a granting of amnesty would also be
an admission of guilt by the United States in waging an illegal war.
On top of this, the use of the premature conscience argument was
another way for proponents of amnesty to link the debate on amnesty with the
Vietnam War. The granting of amnesty, based on the premature conscience
121 “Ford’s Proposal Fails to Please Veterans, Amnesty Activists,” The Chicago Tribune, August
20, 1974.
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argument, would be the same as acknowledging American wrongdoing in
Vietnam. If the fact that draft and military offenders had a “premature
conscience” and resisted a war that the rest of the nation came to view as evil
was the basis of amnesty, then the granting of amnesty would validate the
“premature” views of draft and military offenders regarding the Vietnam War.
Therefore, delegitimizing the view of opponents of amnesty and supporters of
the war that American intervention in Vietnam was the proper course of action.
By tying the debate on amnesty to the debate on the Vietnam War by
juxtaposing the arguments for amnesty with arguments against the war, those in
support of amnesty seized the opportunity to prove the immorality of the
Vietnam War through the granting of amnesty for draft and military offenders.
Opponents of amnesty, on the other hand, completely disregarded the
benefits of amnesty for draft and military offenders in an attempt to legitimize
the actions of the United States and those who served in Vietnam. Opponents of
amnesty, including Vice President Spiro Agnew, believed that the “nation must
be ‘unyielding’ in punishing deserters and draft evaders because they have not
‘admitted they [were] wrong.”122 Similar to the argument taken by proponents of
amnesty, by tying amnesty to forgiveness and an admission of guilt by draft and
military offenders, the United States is simultaneously confirming their position
as correct, while condemning the actions of offenders.
Furthermore, opponents of amnesty, by arguing that it would “further
punish these hapless souls (casualties of war)” if the “red carpet” was laid out
122 Lou Cannon, “Agnew Restates White House’s Amnesty Stance,” The Washington Post,
Times Herald, March 7, 1974.
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“for those who took to their heels” by “mocking their sacrifice”, attempts to
commend the actions of those who served in Vietnam and legitimize their
sacrifices.123 As an alternative to acknowledging the sacrifices of draft and
military offenders and trying to provide them relief, opponents of amnesty were
only concerned with recognizing veterans’ sacrifices and legitimizing their
actions in Vietnam. By contrasting the actions of those who served in Vietnam
with draft and military offenders, proponents of amnesty show the courage and
morality of servicemen while condemning offenders.
Similarly, the arguments used by opponents of amnesty, specifically the
legalism argument and the argument that amnesty insults the sacrifices of those
who served in Vietnam, go beyond the amnesty debate and attempts to condemn
the actions of draft and military offenders as a failure to meet their obligations to
the United States, while promoting the actions of those who served in Vietnam.
The legalism argument proposes that draft and military offenders needed to face
the consequences of their actions and are not deserving of amnesty. This
argument clearly condemns the inability of draft and military offenders to meet
the obligations of service to the United States during the Vietnam War. As the
basis for not granting amnesty, the legalism argument denounced draft and
military offenders as individuals who were not deserving of American
citizenship because they did not meet its obligations or face up to the
consequences of their actions. A denial of amnesty would strengthen the legal
tradition in the United States while reaffirming the need for citizens of the
United States to meet their obligations as countrymen.
123 L. Snodgrass, “Amnesty a ‘Mockery,’” The Chicago Tribune, January 29, 1972.
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In addition, the use of the argument that amnesty insulted those who
made sacrifices in Vietnam condemns the actions of draft and military offenders
while praising veterans. Clearly, by using this argument, opponents of amnesty
have tied honourable service to the United States during the Vietnam War to
proper behaviour of American citizens. Amnesty would take away from the
deeds of the men who served in Vietnam, lessening their sacrifices while
approving of the actions of draft and military offenders, something that the
American public could never condone.
The transformation of the amnesty debate into a battle for symbolic
vindication and the casting aside of the benefits for draft and military offenders
was exacerbated by newspaper coverage. An examination of coverage of the
amnesty debate in The New York Times, Chicago Tribune and The Washington
Post from January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1974 shows how media biases
towards the amnesty debate and the arguments employed facilitated the shift of
the amnesty debate towards symbolic vindication.
Firstly, the newspapers’ focus on the arguments employed by opponents
of amnesty took away from public recognition of the benefits of amnesty for
draft and military offenders. During the period of study, there were seventy-
eight articles that dealt with one or more of the arguments against amnesty
presented previously, compared to fifty-three articles dealing with arguments for
amnesty.124 The increased focus on the opponents of the amnesty side of the
debate detracts from the recognition of the benefits of amnesty because
opponents of amnesty were unconcerned with helping draft and military
124 See Table 1.1
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offenders. As shown previously, opponents of amnesty used the debate on
amnesty as a way to condemn the actions of draft and military offenders, not
support their attempts to rebuild their fractured lives. By focusing on the
“against amnesty” side of the debate, The New York Times, Chicago Tribune and
The Washington Post helped to facilitate the shift away from viewing the
benefits of amnesty by propagating the arguments that disregard them.
Secondly, the focus of The New York Times, Chicago Tribune and The
Washington Post on certain arguments for and against amnesty portrayed the
debate as a battle for vindication of each group’s viewpoint. In support of
amnesty, the newspapers focused on the illegal war argument, the healing
wounds argument and the peace with the enemy argument. Of the fifty-three
articles dealing with the arguments for amnesty, twenty-five fell into the illegal
war argument category and twelve fell into the healing national wounds
argument.125 In opposition to amnesty, the newspapers focused on the legalism
argument and the insult to those who served honourably argument. Of the
seventy-eight articles focusing on arguments against amnesty thirty-one fell into
the legalism argument category and twenty-nine into the insult to those who
served honourably category.126
By focusing on the illegal war argument and the healing national wounds
argument, The New York Times, Chicago Tribune and The Washington Post
portrayed proponents of amnesty as individuals seeking unconditional amnesty
as well as vindication of their viewpoint on the Vietnam War. Once again, the
125 See Table 2.1
126 See Table 2.2
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illegal war argument was a mainstay in both the antiwar movement and the
amnesty debate. Focusing on the illegal war argument helped to proliferate the
view that the granting of amnesty would also be recognition of the illegality of
the war in Vietnam and American wrongdoing. Furthermore, the focus on the
healing national wounds argument portrayed the idea that prosecuting draft and
military offenders would cause further upheaval and show the vindictiveness
and lack of compassion of the United States. This distorted the argument into a
condemnation of American actions regarding draft and military offenders,
turning the granting of amnesty into an acknowledgment of the United States
complicity in “tearing apart” the nation.
By focusing on the legalism and insult to those who served arguments in
opposition to amnesty The New York Times, Chicago Tribune and The
Washington Post portrayed opponents of amnesty as individuals seeking
vindication of their viewpoint and that the United States responded correctly by
intervening in Vietnam. The legalism argument, by asserting that individuals
must face the consequences of their actions, provided a clear condemnation of
draft and military offenders. Through the newspapers’ focus on this argument,
the idea that America was right and draft and military offenders need to be
punished was presented. The denial of amnesty because of the legalism
argument, according to portrayal of the argument in the newspapers, would
provide justification to the view that the United States was right in its actions
and that amnesty would go against the social and judicial order of America by
providing absolution for individuals at odds with the law.
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Furthermore, the focus on the insult to those who served argument
condemned the actions of draft and military offenders, while promoting those of
United States servicemen and elicited a negative emotional response from the
public with regards to the granting of amnesty. By granting coverage to this
argument, the newspapers were depicting the idea that servicemen did the right
thing, whereas, draft and military offenders did not. Also, by linking the
granting of amnesty to “a slap in the face” for those who served in Vietnam,
elicited a strong emotional response from the public. The newspapers coverage
of this argument makes it impossible for Americans to support the granting of
amnesty without making a mockery of the sacrifices of those who served in
Vietnam and further hurting the individuals who lost family and friends in an
unpopular war.
Clearly, the debate on amnesty was transformed from a program of relief
for draft and military offenders and reconciliation for America into an
opportunity for proponents and opponents of amnesty to seek symbolic
vindication for their viewpoints regarding the Vietnam War and amnesty. The
transformation of the issue of amnesty to a debate on the morality of the
Vietnam War began with the tying of the two debates through an attempt from
both sides to justify their actions while delegitimizing their opponents by
highlighting the fact they were wrong. Both sides’ choice of arguments
attempted to complete this task by supporting their stand on amnesty while
promoting their viewpoints on the war. This line of argumentation tied the
granting or denial of amnesty to recognition of the validity of the winner’s views
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on Vietnam. The transformation of the debate, however, was exacerbated by
newspaper coverage that provided a bias against amnesty and focus on
arguments that portrayed the debate as going beyond amnesty and addressing
the morality of the Vietnam War. The argumentation of proponents and
opponents of amnesty combined with biased newspaper coverage led to the
transformation of the amnesty debate into a battle for symbolic justification of
individuals and groups views regarding the Vietnam War, as opposed to a
program of relief and reconciliation for draft and military offenders, and most
importantly, America.
After examining the amnesty debate, its news coverage and symbolic
nature, it is easy to see its influence on President Ford’s creation of his clemency
program unveiled on September 16, 1974. The most relevant influence would
have been the debate as a whole and its transformation into a symbolic means of
vindicating either side’s viewpoint. The advocates and opponents of amnesty,
through the debate, put President Ford in a position where his decision to grant
amnesty or not would exacerbate the divisiveness within America. If President
Ford had decided to grant unconditional amnesty, advocates would have
received the symbolic justification of their views on the actions of draft and
military offenders and the Vietnam War. Believing that their beliefs were
correct, while those opposing amnesty were wrong, the divide between
Americans on opposite sides of the debate would continue to grow, aggravating
the wounds of America caused by Vietnam.
69
If President Ford had decided against the granting of amnesty, the same
scenario would have occurred with opponents of amnesty receiving justification
for their views on draft and military offenders and the Vietnam War, furthering
the divide between the opposing sides. The threat of intensifying the divide
within America and worsening the wounds of the Vietnam era played a role in
President Ford’s decision to take a middle-ground approach to the question of
amnesty. Needing to resolve the issue without driving deeper the wedge between
Americans, President Ford sought a path that would (hopefully) appease both
sides of the amnesty debate without worsening the United States’ problems.
The arguments in support of conditional amnesty only strengthened
President Ford’s acceptance of the middle path because it received the majority
of public support and was a logical choice to begin healing America. With the
majority of the public in support of conditional amnesty with some form of
alternate service, President Ford knew that his decision to take a middle ground
approach and favour conditional amnesty would be supported. On top of this,
conditional amnesty’s amalgamation of arguments from both sides of the debate
allowed President Ford to provide either side with an aspect they supported as
well as an aspect they opposed, hopefully providing a compromise that would be
accepted by both sides in their attempts to reconcile the nation.
With regards to certain aspects of the debate in support and opposed to
amnesty, President Ford’s plan focused on two very important arguments, the
healing national wounds argument proposed by advocates of amnesty and the
legalism argument proposed by opponents of amnesty. Healing the wounds of
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America was an important aspect of President Ford’s clemency program. Ford
himself, in his September 16, 1974 proclamation extending clemency to draft
and military offenders called for reconciliation and mercy “to bind the nation’s
wounds and to heal the scars of divisiveness.”127 Similar to those in support of
amnesty, President Ford realized that something had to be done to place the hurt
of the Vietnam War in the past, for President Ford, however, this was
conditional amnesty, not what advocates of amnesty hoped for.
Another important factor of the healing the wounds argument adopted by
President Ford in the creation of his clemency program was reconciliation for
draft and military offenders. Regardless of the fact that the amnesty debate was
transformed into an opportunity for vindication by both sides, the main objective
behind amnesty was to reconcile draft and military offenders with the nation and
bring back the youths of America to help rebuild in the post-Vietnam era.
President Ford, influenced by the desire to allow “these young Americans…the
chance to contribute a share to the rebuilding of peace,” provided draft and
military offenders a way to earn their re-entry into America.128 Regardless of
how mutated the debate on amnesty became, President Ford, influenced by the
plight of draft and military offenders, sought a way to bring them back into
American society.
The legalism argument proposed by opponents of amnesty featured in
Ford Clemency program through his inclusion of the alternate service condition.
127 “Proclamation Extending Clemency,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, September 17,
1974.
128 “Proclamation Extending Clemency,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, September 17,
1974.
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Opponents of amnesty wanted draft and military offenders to face the
consequences of their actions, because no one is above the law, regardless of
their motivations for disobeying the law. President Ford’s inclusion of alternate
service provided opponents of amnesty with a symbolic reprimand for draft and
military offenders without making them face the full force of the law.
Furthermore, the establishment of the Presidential Clemency Board could be
seen as a direct response to the contentious nature of alternate service within the
amnesty debate. The Presidential Clemency Board could recommend immediate
amnesty for draft and military offenders, making them exempt from alternate
service. This mediated between opponents of amnesty’s demand for punishment
of draft and military offenders and advocates of amnesty’s demand for
unconditional amnesty.
Clearly, the debate on amnesty influenced President Ford’s middle
ground position and the creation of his clemency board. Combining the major
components of both sides of the debate and heeding the advice of those in favour
of conditional amnesty, President Ford created a clemency program that
attempted to bridge the gap between opposing sides, while seeking
reconciliation for draft and military offenders and the United States. Following
the advice of Howard Robison, President Ford created a program that tolerated
the differing viewpoints while relieving the United States “from the tightening
grip of contentiousness and self-righteousness” associated with both sides of the
amnesty debate.129
129 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest 53, no. 10 (October 1974), 242.
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VI. Political Influences
Calls for amnesty and proposals from politicians and other prominent
figures influenced President Ford’s decision to extend clemency to draft and
military offenders and the components of his clemency program. These political
influences demanded that the amnesty issue be resolved and provided ideas
President Ford incorporated into his own program. The influences of Senator
Robert Taft Jr. of Ohio, members of the United States House of Representatives
Howard W. Robison and Bella Abzug and President of the National Council of
Churches of Christ in the United States of America (NCC) Dr. W. Sterling Cary
played a role in President Ford’s creation of his program.
Senator Robert Taft Jr. proposed amnesty at two different times, in 1971
and 1974. His first, made in December of 1971, proposed that individuals who
evaded or refused the draft through self-imposed exile or prison be offered a
chance to come back to America. In order to return, draft offenders needed to
complete a three year tour in the military or three years of alternate service
designated by a federal agency.130 Draft offenders who chose prison over exile
would have the same choice, however, according to Taft’s proposal, up to two
years of prison time could be deducted from their three years of service.131
Taft’s amnesty proposal excluded military offenders (who were viewed as
deserters at this time) and provided draft offenders a one year period to apply for
amnesty.
130 George Lardner Jr., “Taft Asks Amnesty For Draft Dodgers,” The Washington Post, Times
Herald, December 15, 1971.
131 George Lardner Jr., “Taft Asks Amnesty For Draft Dodgers,” The Washington Post, Times
Herald, December 15, 1971.
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Taft’s proposal of amnesty came about because he felt that individuals
who evaded or refused the draft and wanted a second chance should be entitled
to it. This did not include all draft offenders; he felt that his plan would only be
accepted by individuals who realized they had made a mistake. Taft believed
that “many of these draft resisters are victims of bad judgement or poor advice.
Others have acted out of deep and conscientious objections to the course which
our country followed as we became involved in the Vietnam conflict.”132
Taft’s second amnesty proposal, the Earned Immunity Act of 1974, S.
2832, was introduced in the 93rd congress and was similar to his previous
proposal. Taft’s second proposal, however, was elaborated into a complete
program of reconciliation. Similar to his previous proposal, the Earned
Immunity Act of 1974 required draft offenders to complete alternate service
(two years now instead of three), excluded military offenders from the proposal
and provided a period of one year for offenders to apply for amnesty.133 Also
excluded from amnesty under Taft’s proposal were individuals who committed
crimes during the eligibility period that were unrelated to the Selective Service
Act.
Draft offenders who violated Selective Service laws between 4 August
1964 and 27 January 1973 would be eligible to apply to the Immunity Review
Board in an attempt to receive amnesty. The Immunity Review Board, according
to Taft’s proposal, would be composed of five presidentially elected members,
132 George Lardner Jr., “Taft Asks Amnesty For Draft Dodgers,” The Washington Post, Times
Herald, December 15, 1971.
133 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest 53,  no. 10 (October 1974), 236.
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four of whom would be selected through recommendations from the Majority
and Minority leaders of the Senate and the Speaker and Minority leader of the
House. The Immunity Review Board would be authorized to review violations
of the Military Selective Service Act and grant immunity to draft offenders upon
completed of two years service in the Armed Forces or private or public service
that contributed to the national health, safety or welfare.134
With regards to alternate service, the Immunity Review Board would
have discretion as to the length of an individual offender’s service, up to the
maximum of two years. Mitigating circumstances that would affect the length of
alternate service included; inaccurate interpretation of the Selective Service Act,
qualifying for conscientious objector status under the decision of the Supreme
Court on 27 January 1973, obligations to one’s family that were not of the
individuals making, a lack of mental capacity putting  the wilfulness of
offenders’ actions in question, whether the individual has in the past or is
currently subject to sanctions in which he seeks immunity and any other factors
that may be considered.135 In Taft’s proposal, selective opposition to the
Vietnam War was not considered a valid mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the obvious comparisons between Taft’s proposals and
President Ford’s clemency program, such as the similar periods of offence
eligibility (both periods begin on 4 August 1964 and end within months of each
other, January for Taft and March for President Ford, in 1973), required




clemency program both require two years) and their decisions to pursue
conditional amnesty there were significant similarities between the programs
that can be viewed as Taft’s proposals influencing the creation of President
Ford’s clemency program. By comparing these components of Taft’s proposals
and President Ford’s program, it is quite clear how Taft influenced Ford.
 Both Taft’s Earned Immunity Act of 1974 and President Ford’s
clemency program established review boards, the Immunity Review Board and
the Presidential Clemency Board respectively, in order to deal with draft and
military offenders (in Taft’s case, just draft offenders) on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, the Presidential Clemency Board, like the Immunity Review
Board, factored in mitigating circumstances when deciding on recommendations
on how to deal with draft and military offenders. They differ, however, in the
fact that the Presidential Clemency Board does not have the power to enforce
their recommendations, whereas Taft’s board did. Clearly, President Ford
wanted to ensure the equity of his clemency program by receiving
recommendations from his board and choosing whether or not to follow these
recommendations in granting amnesty.
Another area that Taft and Ford agreed upon was the handling of military
offenders. Taft excluded military offenders from his proposal of earned
immunity because they are covered by a “completely different legal system that
is inextricably intertwined with considerations of military discipline.”136 Taft’s
acknowledgment of the complexities of including military offenders in his
Earned Immunity Act may have influenced President Ford’s decision to provide
136 Ibid, 238.
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administrative functions of amnesty for fugitive military absence offenders to
the Department of Defense. Like Taft, perhaps Ford recognized the complexities
of amnesty with regards to military discipline and decided the best course of
action for military offenders would be to allow the Department of Defense to
oversee that portion of the clemency program.
Furthermore, examining Ford’s rationale behind granting clemency
compared to Taft’s, it is easy to see that both men sought to provide offenders a
second chance, should they be willing to accept. Ford wanted to give young
Americans the chance to “earn their return to the mainstream of American
society so that they can, if they choose, contribute even though belatedly to the
building and betterment of our country and the world.”137 Although Taft’s belief
that some draft offenders had come to realize they made an error and were
deserving of a second chance was different from Ford’s that some of the draft
and military offenders wanted to contribute to the bettering of America, both
men sought to give offenders who wanted a way to reconcile with America, a
second chance.
United States Representative Howard W. Robison a Republican, like
Taft, had the unique perspective of being a lawyer, he graduated in 1939 from
Cornell Law School, and veteran, he served in the Counter Intelligence Corps
during World War II from 1942 to 1946. Similar to Taft, Robison proposed a
program of conditional amnesty for draft and military offenders in an address
delivered on 25 February 1974. Robison’s proposal called for the establishment
137 “White House Details Clemency Program Operation,” The Washington Post, Times Herald,
September 17, 1974.
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of a National Amnesty Board, modelled after President Truman’s post World
War II amnesty, which would review each application for amnesty on a case-by-
case basis and then make a set of recommendations to the President, including
the appropriate term of alternate service. To be eligible for Robison’s amnesty,
offenses had to have occurred between 4 August 1964 and 29 March 1973 or
when the President announced that all American soldiers missing-in-action were
accounted for.138
Robison’s proposal also called for draft and military offenders to
complete a required amount of service, up to a maximum of two years, either in
the military or a civilian service that contributes to national objectives, such as
health, safety or environmental quality. Once again, mitigating factors would be
considered when determining the amount of alternate service and once terms
were agreed between the board and the offender, a recommendation would be
made. For those in prison, the amount of alternate service would be reduced
based on the time they have already served. Failure to comply with the terms of
the agreement would cause draft and military offenders to be subject to
prosecution for their pending violations.139
Robison’s proposal, like Taft’s, had some very obvious similarities to
President Ford’s clemency program. Robison’s and Taft’s proposals, compared
to Ford’s program all called for the establishment of review boards, had similar
time frames for offense eligibility, considered mitigating factors in determining
the length of alternate service and required a maximum of two years alternate
138 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest 53, no. 10 (October 1974), 242.
139 Ibid, 242.
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service. Robison’s proposal, however, influenced the creation of Ford’s
clemency program with respect to the Presidential Clemency Board. Robison’s
National Amnesty Board, unlike Taft’s Immunity Review Board, did not have
the power to authorize amnesty. Instead, Robison’s board, similar to the form
the Presidential Clemency Board took seven months later, could only provide
recommendations for action. This difference from Taft’s proposal, may have
contributed to the creation of President Ford’s clemency program and the
Presidential Clemency Board.
United States Representative Bella Abzug, in contrast to Taft and
Robison, proposed a program of unconditional amnesty for all draft and military
offenders. Abzug had a history of opposition to United States aggression and the
Vietnam War; she helped found Women Strike for Peace in 1961 and led mass
rallies and lobbying efforts against the arms race and the Vietnam War.140 This
gave Abzug a different perspective on amnesty because she held antiwar views.
Abzug’s proposal would grant unconditional amnesty to all classes of essentially
non-violent war resisters. This would include draft and military offenders, as
well as participants of the antiwar movement.  The amnesty granted by Abzug’s
proposal would be immediate, but an amnesty commission would be established
to grant amnesty to violators of federal, state or local laws if such violations
were motivated by opposition to the war and did not result in significant
personal injury or property damage. Furthermore, her proposal would restore all
civil, political, citizenship and property rights of draft and military offenders,




immunize them from criminal prosecution, restore those imprisoned, expunge
all criminal records and require the Armed Forces to grant honourable
discharges in place of less-than honourable discharges.141
Dr. W. Sterling Cary, President of the NCC, in testimony presented on
March 11, 1974, before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, similar to Abzug,
proposed unconditional amnesty for draft and military offenders. As opposed to
going into specifics regarding a program for unconditional amnesty, Dr. Cary
outlined the form amnesty needed to take in order to establish the goals of
reconciling the nation and helping draft and military offenders. According to Dr.
Cary, amnesty needed to include “all who are in legal jeopardy because of the
war in Indochina” because this type of amnesty is demanded by “genuine
reconciliation.”142
Those in legal jeopardy because of the Vietnam War comprised five
groups according to Dr. Cary and the NCC. The first group was draft and
military offenders who exiled themselves in other countries. The second was the
draft and military offenders in prisons or stockades, on probation, who served
their sentences and those who are subject to prosecution for violations of the
draft or military law. The third were the draft and military offenders who went
underground to avoid prosecution. The fourth were Vietnam-era veterans with
less-than-honourable discharges. And the fifth and final group were those who
141 “Should ‘Conditional Amnesty’ Be Granted to Vietnam War Draft Evaders?’ Congressional
Digest 53, no. 10 (October 1974), 237.
142 Ibid, 241.
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committed civilian acts of resistance to the war or were being prosecuted upon
allegations of the same.143
Abzug’s and Dr. Cary’s proposals of complete and unconditional
amnesty for draft and military offenders, as well as individuals who violated the
laws of the nation in opposition to the Vietnam War, did not have obvious
similarities to President Ford’s clemency program. Abzug’s and Dr. Cary’s
proposals, however, would provide honourable discharges to veterans hampered
by discharges under less-than honourable conditions. This is something that Taft
and Robison failed to deal with in their proposals, but was eventually included
in President Ford’s clemency program. Abzug’s and Dr. Cary’s consideration
for veterans with less-than-honourable discharges may have influenced Ford’s
decision to include them in his clemency program.
In addition, Abzug’s call for complete and unconditional amnesty may
have influenced President Ford into granting unconditional clemency to draft
and military offenders upon recommendation from his Presidential Clemency
Board. Although Ford’s clemency program did not call for unconditional
amnesty for draft and military offenders, upon the recommendation of his
Presidential Clemency Board, Ford granted immediate clemency to 6,200 of the
15, 486 applicants.144 Clearly, Abzug’s proposal for unconditional amnesty may
have played a role in the Presidential Clemency Board’s recommendations of
immediate clemency and President Ford’s decision to agree.
143 Ibid, 241.
144 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation after Vietnam, 139.
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The presidency of Richard Nixon also influenced President Ford’s
decision to extend clemency to draft and military offenders. Nixon, during his
presidency, was hoping to heal America after the social introspection and vocal
protest of the 1960s. Nixon, however, failed. Foreign policy was Nixon’s
passion and secrecy was his tool, leading to repression of dissent through
spying, infiltration and harassment, fuelling the deep divisions within
America.145 Nixon’s failure to deal with the turbulence of the 1960s combined
with his less than savoury tactics left President Ford saddled with the
consequences; a citizenry that had lost faith in the institution of the presidency.
According to Richard Reeves, in his work A Ford, Not A Lincoln, the
Ford presidency, in an attempt to deal with the residuals of the Nixon
administration, had three priorities:
    1. Restoration of the confidence and trust of the American
people in their political leadership, institutions and processes.
This is the major principle and others relate to it.
    2. Assumption of control which is firm and efficient.
    3. National feeling of unification and reconciliation enabled by
the character and style of the new President.146
In order to combat the residuals of the Nixon administration and restore the
confidence of the citizenry in the political leadership and unify the nation,
President Ford chose to distance himself from the former President’s
administration by addressing the divisive issue of clemency for draft and
military offenders.
145 John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1995), 19.
146 Richard Reeves, A Ford, Not A Lincoln (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 71.
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Nixon’s remarks in the early 1970s discouraged immediate amnesty, but
left the option of leniency in the postwar period. However, as the war neared its
end, firmer views regarding amnesty were expressed by Nixon and his
administration. In a January 3, 1972 television interview, in response to the
question of granting amnesty, Nixon responded,
I for one would be very liberal with regard to amnesty, but not
while there are Americans in Vietnam fighting to serve their
country and not while P.O.W.’s are held by the enemy. After that,
we will consider it, but it would have to be on a basis of their of
course paying the price that anyone should pay for violating the
law.147
Nixon followed up with this view in an August 29, 1972 news conference where
he claimed “before they can obtain amnesty and pardon…pay a penalty; others
paid with their lives.”148 Nixon’s views on amnesty in the early 1970s were
lenient, Nixon would consider conditional amnesty once all those who served in
the United States Armed Forces were accounted for and the war was finished.
These lenient views, however, would change as the war neared its end.
Just two months later, on October 30, 1972, President Nixon proclaimed that it
was “time to draw the line on this issue once and for all…there will be no
amnesty for draft dodgers and deserters after the war.”149 Once again, Nixon’s
views regarding amnesty continued to harden, with his rejection of both
unconditional and conditional amnesty. In a February 1, 1973 article, Nixon
rejected conditional amnesty when he claimed that “those who deserted must
147 “Excerpts From the Television Interview With President Nixon at the White House,” The
New York Times, January 3, 1973.
148 “Transcript of News Conference by the President on Political and Other Matters,” The New
York Times, August 30, 1972.
149 Albert B. Crenshaw, “No Amnesty, Nixon Vows,” The Washington Post, Times Herald,
October 30, 1972.
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pay their price…the price is not a junket in the Peace Corps, or something like
that…the price is a criminal penalty for disobeying the laws of the United
States.”150 Nixon was not offering draft and military offenders any leniency;
instead, their return would be conditioned upon their serving of a criminal
penalty, an option they had available to them throughout the Vietnam era.
President Ford’s administration reversed Nixon’s “amnesty never”
stance in an attempt to restore the trust of the citizenry in the American political
system and draw a distinction between former President Nixon and President
Ford. Ford felt that “unless I did something to restore their trust, I couldn’t win
their consent to do anything else.”151 To restore this trust, President Ford
decided to take a lenient and merciful approach to the question of amnesty and
attempt to hasten the healing of the damage caused by the Vietnam era and the
errors of the Nixon administration.
In Ford’s first words as President on August 9, 1974, he acknowledged a
“higher Power…who ordains not only righteousness but love, not only justice
but mercy.”152 Ford’s acknowledgement of a higher power, combined with his
need to distance himself from the Nixon administration, led to his consideration
of amnesty for draft and military offenders. Just ten days later, in his address
before the 75th convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, President Ford
150 George Lardner Jr., “Nixon Rejects Amnesty for Deserters,” The Washington Post, Times
Herald, February 1, 1973.
151 Gerald R. Ford, A Time To Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper
& Row, 1979), 125.
152 “Gerald R. Ford’s Remarks on Taking the Oath of Office as President,” August 9, 1974,
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expressed his administrations position on amnesty. In a strong reversal of
Nixon’s ‘amnesty never’ stance, he proclaimed that:
Unconditional blanket amnesty for anyone who illegally evaded
or fled military service is wrong…Yet in my first words as
President of all the people, I acknowledged a Power higher than
the people who commands not only righteousness but love, not
only justice but mercy…I found on my desk where the buck
stops, the urgent problem of how to bind up the Nation’s wounds.
And I intend to do that.153
Ford’s address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was a direct indication that
Nixon was gone, and that Ford was a president who was compassionately aware
of the divisions among Americans.
Ford’s administration believed that some sort of re-entry plan for draft
and military offenders would cement his image as a conciliator, giving him the
opportunity to bring to an end one more part of what Ford viewed as the long
national nightmare of the sixties. Most importantly, addressing the issue of
amnesty would grant the new administration the dramatic jump start that it
needed, allowing President Ford to draw a distinction between the Ford and
Nixon administrations that would be difficult for the public to ignore.154
President Ford’s decision to address the amnesty issue through his offer
of clemency to draft and military offenders was clearly influenced by the
president’s attempt to distance himself from the Nixon administration. Ford’s
goals to restore faith in the American political system and bring about
reconciliation and unification were directly influenced by the divisive and
untrustworthy nature of the Nixon administration. Nixon’s secrecy and
153 “Not Only Justice, But Mercy,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, August 20, 1974.
154 John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, 39.
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subterfuge led to a distrust of political leaders and institutions among the
citizenry and his denial of consideration of amnesty led to divisiveness among a
people that could not agree on the merits of the Vietnam War and attempts to
avoid it. President Ford, Nixon’s former Vice President, needed to correct the
mistakes of the Nixon administration, while at the same time proving that Ford
was not just a Nixon holdover.
The decision to grant clemency was an excellent way for President Ford
to show he was his own man and, he hoped, a superior leader to Nixon.
Although there were many other factors, some already discussed, surrounding
the amnesty issue that influenced Ford’s decision, granting clemency provided
President Ford with a way to prove to America that his Presidency would
provide “not only righteousness but love, not only justice but mercy” and an
“openness and candour” that was unthinkable under former President Nixon.
Another factor that may have influenced President Ford’s decision to
grant clemency was his decision to pardon former President Nixon for his
involvement in Watergate. Watergate was a complex web of political scandals
from 1972 to 1974 that began with the Watergate Burglars breaking into the
Democratic Party’s National Committee offices on June 17, 1972 and
culminated in the resignation of President Nixon. 155 The Watergate scandal led
to the House Judiciary Committee on July 27, 1974 to pass the first three articles
155 Alfred E. Lewis, “5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here,” The Washington Post,
Times Herald, June 18, 1972, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html.
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of impeachment against Nixon, charging obstruction of justice.156 Instead of
facing impeachment, on August 8, 1974, President Nixon resigned from office
promoting Vice President Ford into the role of President.
President Ford believed that a prolonged period of vituperation and
recrimination regarding Watergate would be disastrous to the nation. He felt that
the hate needed to be drained and the healing begun.157 Ford, in his address
following the swearing-in ceremony, said “as we bind up the internal wounds of
Watergate…let us restore the Golden Rule to our political process, and let
brotherly love purge our hearts or suspicion and hate.”158 Ford’s discussion of
binding the internal wounds of Watergate and purging suspicion and hate could
be seen as an attempt to set the stage for a pardon of Richard Nixon.  Pardoning
Nixon, however, could not be done unless Ford had provided relief for the draft
and military offenders seeking amnesty. To many Americans, “mercy must be
democratic or it will be humbug” leaving Ford with only one option, a pardon
for Nixon coupled with clemency for draft and military offenders.
Although the influences behind Nixon’s pardon are debatable to this day,
its connection to clemency for draft and military offenders is clear. President
Ford needed to move beyond the problems caused by the Nixon administration
and the Vietnam War in order to begin healing the wounds of the nation but also
needed to consider his former superior and friend when dealing with the
Watergate scandal. Regardless of whether or not there was a secret deal between
156 The Watergate Story, “Watergate Timeline,” The Washington Post, Times Herald,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html.
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158 Jules Witcover, “Ford Becomes 38th President, Promises Openness and Candor,” The
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Ford and Nixon regarding Nixon’s resignation and subsequent pardon, any
discussion of pardon for Nixon needed to be matched by efforts to reconcile
with draft and military offenders. If President Ford intended on granting Nixon a
pardon (which he did) he would have to provide similar relief to draft and
military offenders or he would never regain the trust of the American citizenry
and never attain the reconciliation and unification within America that he
sought.
Furthermore, President Ford’s awareness of the national constituency
and his desire to heal the wounds of America influenced his decision to extend
clemency to draft and military offenders of the Vietnam era. Ford, before
assuming the Presidency, took a similar stance to Richard Nixon, with regards to
amnesty. On August 5, 1974, then Vice President, Ford proclaimed that
“unconditional blanket amnesty to anyone who illegally evaded or fled military
service is wrong.”159 Although Ford is condemning unconditional amnesty,
something he never extended to draft and military offenders, the mercy and
leniency he offered in his Veterans of Foreign Wars address is not evident.
When Ford became President he realized that “in the years since JFK,
the country has been buffeted by riots in major cities, political assassinations, a
bloody and divisive war, and the tawdry spectacle of Watergate; what we
159 “Ford Opposes an Amnesty for Deserters or Evaders,” The New York Times, August 6, 1974.
President Ford also acknowledged that unconditional amnesty was wrong in his address to the
Veterans of Foreign Wars made on August 19, 1974. The rest of the address, however, signifies
his shift in opinion regarding conditional amnesty.
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needed now, was a time to heal.”160 According to a close friend, President Ford
understood that “he’s one of the few people in a position to keep this country
from falling apart.”161 Ford understood that regardless of whether Americans
supported, opposed or were undecided on the question of amnesty, they all
desired the same thing: to get past the divisiveness of the Vietnam War and put
behind them the tribulations faced by America in the past two decades. President
Ford knew his role, to clean up the messes of previous presidential
administrations.162
President Ford’s awareness of the national constituency greatly
influenced his decision to extend clemency to draft and military offenders.
Henry Kissinger believed that President Ford had “a great sense of the heartbeat
of America…Ford was very much in tune with the country.”163 His awareness of
the national constituency, as well as their influence on his decision to grant
clemency can be seen through a comparison of public opinion polls regarding
amnesty and President Ford’s Clemency program.
Ford’s decision to provide conditional amnesty through his clemency
program reflected the majority of Americans’ views on amnesty. Harris polls
from June 1972 to March 1973 showed a rise from 53% to 67% of individuals
who opposed unconditional amnesty for draft and military offenders.164 On top
of this, Gallup polls from July 1972 to March 1973 showed steady opposition to
160 Ford, A Time To Heal, 124.
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163 James M. Cannon, Time and Chance: Gerald Ford’s Appointment With History (New York:
Harper Collins, 1994), 394.
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unconditional amnesty, with 64% opposed in July 1972 rising to 67% opposed
in March 1973.165 The national constituency’s views, like President Ford’s, were
softened by the political realities faced in 1974, with their opposition to allowing
evaders back into mainstream America without punishment dropping to 58%,
while 34% of American’s polled approved of conditional amnesty.166 Clearly the
nation remained divided on the question of amnesty, with some advocating
punishment or no amnesty, while others advocated unconditional amnesty. The
majority of Americans (58%), however, were in favour of amnesty with
conditions.
On top of this, individuals polled who believed that draft and military
offenders should not be allowed back without punishment were also asked what
form punishment should take. A March 1973 poll, found that 18% of Americans
polled believed military service should be required, 10% believed non-military
service should be the punishment and 18% believed either military or non-
military service should be required of draft and military offenders wishing to
return to mainstream America.167 Thirteen percent believed that a jail sentence
or a fine should be conditional of a draft or military resisters return.168 A poll
conducted a year later, in April of 1974, found similar results, with 20%
advocating military service, 9% advocating non-military service, 16%
165 Gallup Polls July 1972 – March 1973.
166 Gallup Poll 21 April 1974.
167 Gallup Poll 5 March 1973.
168 Gallup Poll 5 March 1973.
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advocating either military or non-military service, and 8% advocating jail
sentences or fines as punishment for draft and military offenders.169
Ford’s awareness of the public’s desire to heal the wounds of the past
decades and their opinions on amnesty clearly influenced his decision to extend
clemency to draft and military resisters. Acknowledging that opposition to
unconditional amnesty was declining in 1974 (down to 58%) and that support
for conditional amnesty was on the rise (34% in April of 1974); President Ford
constructed a clemency program that provided conditional amnesty to draft and
military offenders. Although 58% of Americans opposed unconditional amnesty,
many of them were not against draft and military offenders returning to
America, they were against them returning without punishment. President Ford,
clearly aware of the 45% in 1974 who advocated military service, non-military
service or both as a form of punishment for draft and military offenders, made
his granting of clemency through the program conditioned on completing
alternate service that contributed to the national health, safety or interest.
Clearly the feelings of the public regarding amnesty for draft and
military offenders expressed through opinion polls had an effect on President
Ford’s decision to extend clemency. The public was clearly divided on the issue,
but the majority opposed unconditional amnesty, making it impossible for
President Ford to propose general amnesty in order to heal the nation’s wounds.
The divide among Americans left President Ford with only one option: to devise
and implement a program that would be supported by the majority of
Americans, while not being directly opposed by the rest. Ford accomplished this
169 Gallup Poll 21 April 1974.
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through a Clemency program that combined the most popular ideas regarding
amnesty (conditional with military or non-military service) among the public
with a genuine attempt to reconcile with draft and military resisters.
The public’s desire to heal the wounds of America further influenced
President Ford’s decision to grant clemency to draft and military resisters
because President Ford himself strived to heal the national wounds caused by
Vietnam. Believing that he needed to replace the “national frown with a national
smile” and a way to do this was to bridge the divide within America caused by
the war in Vietnam.170  Ford’s desire to heal is best seen in his address to the
Veterans of Foreign Wars made on August 19, 1974. As stated earlier, in the
address he acknowledged that he found on his “desk where the buck stops, the
urgent problem of how to bind the Nation’s wounds” and that he was “throwing
the weight of [his] Presidency into the scales of justice on the side of
leniency.”171
Another example of Ford’s desire to heal the nation can be seen through
his decision to extend clemency to draft and military offenders despite the
political fallout he suffered as a result. President Ford and his advisors must
have known a decision on amnesty would have political consequences on Ford’s
popularity as president. Regardless of how he addressed the issue of amnesty,
Ford would be faced with condemnation from some sector of America, whether
it was those in support of unconditional amnesty, conditional amnesty, or
opposed to amnesty in general. According to a Gallup poll conducted on 1
170 Ford, A Time To Heal, 127.
171 Congressional Digest 53, no. 10 (October 1974), 231-232.
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September 1974, 71% of Americans polled approved of how President Ford was
handling his job.172 One month later, a Gallup poll conducted on 13 October
1974, after President Ford had announced the details of his clemency program
and pardoned former President Nixon, in an attempt to heal the nation, his
approval rating dropped twenty-one points to 50%.173
President Ford knew the political risks of extending clemency to draft
and military offenders, but still went ahead with his plan to heal the nation. The
fact that Ford would put healing the nation above his chance of re-election in the
future, showed Ford’s desire to heal the wounds caused by the Vietnam War.
His desire to move the nation forward, combined with his awareness that the
national constituency desired the same, influenced Ford to use his time as
president to help heal America through a program of clemency for draft and
military offenders.
Ford’s awareness of public opinion, as well as the people’s shared desire
to heal the national wounds, influenced Ford’s decision to extend clemency to
draft and military offenders. The nation was divided by the war in Vietnam, and
regardless of this division, American’s strived to be whole once more. President
Ford, aware of this desire and striving for unity himself, sought to bring
America together by providing draft and military offenders with a chance to earn
their re-entry into the American mainstream and begin the process of healing.
172 Gallup Poll, 1 September 1974.
173 Gallup Poll, 13 October 1974.
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VII. Ford’s Clemency Program: Success or Failure?
John Robert Greene in his work The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford,
argued that President Ford “healed the scars of the spirit caused by Watergate
and Vietnam, and the nation was stronger in 1976 than it had been in 1974.”
Ford himself opined that if he were to be remembered, it would “probably be for
healing the land.”174 President Ford attempted to heal the wounds of the nation
caused by the Vietnam War by extending clemency to draft and military
offenders, but did this heal the wounds of America or rub salt in them?
Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, in their study
Reconciliation After Vietnam:  A Program of Relief For Vietnam Era Draft and
Military Offenders argued that the Ford program failed because it was too
punitive, its conditions too unrealistic and its benefits too meagre. Furthermore,
its case-by-case examination was complex and expensive and its public
information campaign was inadequate. Above all, the clemency it offered was
no better, and sometimes worse, than relief that was available through normal
channels.175 Baskir and Strauss, however, argued that these were not the root
problems with the Ford program; instead, they were symptoms of the
fundamental weaknesses within Ford’s program.
Firstly, according to Baskir and Strauss, the clemency concept was an
awkward compromise influenced by the political environment of the 1970s.
Ford chose the middle ground position in offering conditional, case-by-case
clemency, a position that was clearly influenced by opposing sides of the
174 John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, 193.
175 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 45.
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amnesty debate. According to Baskir and Strauss, this provided a temporary
respite from the emotional issue of amnesty, while ignoring the real policy
problems of the amnesty issue.176
Secondly, Baskir and Strauss argued that Ford’s initial address to the
Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 9, 1974 focused on traditional images of
draft and military offenders, which was a result of inadequate planning. Ford’s
program was based around the misconception that draft and military offenders
were well-educated, middle-class war resisters who would be flexible enough in
the future plans to acquiesce to alternate service.177 Ford’s inability to
understand who the draft and military offenders were was a result of inadequate
planning. A lack of policy papers regarding amnesty combined with Ford’s
commitment to clemency led to the creation of a program that needed sufficient
inquiries into the background and status of Vietnam-era offenders.178
Finally, Baskir and Strauss argued that Ford’s program provided the
wrong government agencies with unsupervised authority and lacked sufficient
Presidential participation. In organizing the clemency program the White House
sought advice from the Justice Department, Defense Department and Selective
Service. This led to the decentralization of the program and left program
operation in the hands of the agencies draft and military offenders had rebelled
against. 179 On top of this, the program was based on President Ford’s personal
convictions, not those of his administration. This led to Ford’s disassociation
176 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 46.
177 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 46.
178 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 46-47.
179 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 47.
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from the program, causing the program to be less popular, less understood and
less effectively administered. According to Baskir and Strauss, if President Ford
had been the biggest advocate of his program and wrested control from other
agencies, the problems would not have occurred. 180
The only issue with Baskir and Strauss’ assessment of President Ford’s
clemency program is their focus on the program’s apparatus and how it affected
draft and military offenders. In assessing the program, it is helpful to keep in
mind that the program had two main purposes, reconciliation and unification.
Ford wanted to reconcile with draft and military offenders to bring back the
youth of America and unify the United States after the divisiveness of the
Vietnam War.
The clemency program’s lack of participants made the program look
unsuccessful, however, a large number of Vietnam-era offenders took advantage
of Ford’s offer. Of the 113,337 individuals identified as draft and military
offenders by Ford’s program, 21,819 individuals sought clemency, which was
twenty percent of all identified and eligible offenders.181 Fugitive AWOL
offenders as a group had the highest participation rates, with 56 percent, or
5,615 of 10,115 identified offenders.182 Discharged AWOL offenders had the
lowest participation rates, with 15 percent, or 13,589 of 90,000 identified
offenders.183 Convicted draft offenders and unconvicted draft offenders had
180 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 47.
181 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 138.
182 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 138.
183 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 138.
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participation rates of 22 percent (1,879 of 8,700 identified individuals) and 17
percent (736 of 4,522 identified individuals) respectively.184
Although only 20 percent of identified and eligible draft and military
offenders took advantage of Ford’s clemency offer, it was not proof of the
program’s failure. The low participation rates could be indicative of
unwillingness among draft and military offenders to accept Ford’s proposal.
Many draft and military offenders decided that they would accept nothing less
than unconditional amnesty and saw Ford’s program as a rejection of this
concept. Rich Paterak, a draft offender who sought exile in Canada, echoed the
view of other draft and military offenders that “the only kind of amnesty that
will work is one that will in effect, say, forget it.”185 Gerry Condon, argued that
Ford “wanted to extract yet another pound of flesh from those who have
conscientiously resisted an illegal and immoral war.”186
Another reason for the low participation rates in Ford’s program was an
inadequate public information campaign. Before embarking on a public
information campaign in January 1975, only one thousand individuals applied to
the presidential clemency board. After the public information campaign, there
was a sharp increase in applications for presidential clemency, with 5,910
applications in February 1975 and 5,550 applications in March 1975.187 Draft
and military offenders, seemingly, were unaware of President Ford’s clemency
184 Baskir and Strauss, Reconciliation After Vietnam, 138.
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program or whether or not they were eligible to apply. The sharp increase in
participation however, was short-lived with the application deadline passing in
April of 1975.
Ford’s clemency program had low participation rates and was not
utilized by draft and military offenders, but that does not necessarily reflect on
the programs faults. Ford provided draft and military offenders with an
opportunity to work their way back into mainstream America, the choice was
theirs to accept or reject this offer. Although there are merits to Baskir and
Strauss’ arguments that the program was an awkward compromise or that it
focused on a misconception of who draft and military offenders were, Ford’s
program was not created only for the benefit of draft and military offenders.
Although reconciliation for draft and military offenders was one of the goals of
Ford’s program, unification of the nation divided by the Vietnam War was the
most important goal.
Unifying the nation after the divisiveness of the Vietnam War was no
easy task. President Ford hoped that resolving the issue of amnesty in a way that
would be beneficial to draft and military offenders seeking an opportunity for re-
entry into America and start mending the divisions with America would help
heal the nation and begin the rebuilding process of the post-Vietnam era. Ford’s
clemency program was an important step in the direction of healing, but
opinions on its success in reconciling and unifying the nation were mixed.
For some Ford’s plan provided the first step towards healing the nation
in the post-Vietnam era. These individuals believed that Ford viewed the
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problem of amnesty from “the perspective of healing the last vestige of
divisiveness remaining from the Vietnam War” and that his plan offered hope
that “After years of anguish over the American involvement in Vietnam, one of
the last remaining divisive issues of the war was finally out in the open – with at
least the prospect that America would eventually be able to lay the matter of
amnesty and the lingering pain of the war to rest.”188
Those who believed that the nation benefited from President Ford’s offer
of clemency to draft and military offenders felt Ford was “acting with mercy
toward a group of citizens whom his predecessor had cast into darkness. And it
has all but completely removed the amnesty issue from public and political
debate.”189 In the eyes of his supporters, Ford’s clemency program asked draft
and military offenders to “pay a price for having shirked military service” but
tempered this price with mercy, in order to “create an atmosphere of conciliation
in a nation wrecked too long by traumatic conflict.”190 These individuals
believed that Ford had provided a program that would appease the nation by
providing conditional amnesty, while facilitating the healing of the wounds of
the Vietnam War by putting the issue of amnesty to rest.
Others felt that Ford’s program failed to achieve its goals and did not
facilitate healing in the post-Vietnam era. Reverend Fred Trost of Clergy and
Laity Concerned (CALC), believed that President Ford’s clemency program:
Failed politically by deepening divisions in our society rather
than promoting unity; it has failed psychologically by prolonging
188Bob Wiedrich, “Amnesty Solution Vital To New Unity,” Chicago Tribune, August 26, 1974
and “Next, A Vietnam Amnesty,” Newsweek, Vol. 84, Sept. 16, 1974, 33.
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mental anguish of those seeking a resolution for themselves, their
families and the nation; it has failed economically by providing
no relief for the thousands with ‘bad discharges’ who are denied
employment; it has failed morally by refusing to recognized the
supreme right of conscience to oppose an immoral war.191
Rev. Trost’s views are at the extreme end, others believed that Ford’s program
was merely a disappointment. It was not a failure because some individuals took
advantage of the opportunity to receive clemency, it was a disappointment
because only “22,500 did accept the offer and are in the process of returning to
society with a clean slate.”192
Others who believed Ford’s program was a failure pointed to the fact that
applying for the program was not worth it for Vietnam-era draft and military
offenders. These individuals believed that one flaw of Ford’s program was that
“draft offenders, who have already paid a substantial penalty, may be asked to
do a term of alternate service to receive a presidential pardon that still leaves the
original conviction on their records.”193 Another flaw was “the requirement of
an oath of allegiance from men who feel strongly that they never spurned their
government.”194 These flaws led some to conclude that Ford’s clemency
program was not worthwhile for draft and military offenders.
Some observers viewed low participation rates as a way to condemn
draft and military offenders further. Harry D. Leinenweber, chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee from 1973-1983, argued that Ford’s clemency
program showed the true character of draft and military offenders. Leinenweber
191 Steven Pratt, “…Clerics Here Call Ford Plan Failure,” Chicago Tribune, April 1, 1975.
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never bought “the argument that assorted deserters and draft dodgers were
idealists who would leap at the chance to serve their country in peaceful ways.
The small number participating reflects on the quality of the eligible, not on the
program.”195 For these individuals, it was not Ford’s program that was the issue;
instead it was the undesirable character of draft and military offenders.
In conclusion, Ford’s clemency program was successful in creating an
atmosphere of reconciliation and unification in the post-Vietnam period.
Although Baskir and Strauss have pointed out the flaws and failures of President
Ford’s program, it was still an important step towards the resolution of the
divide within America and the beginning of a period of healing. Ford’s program
kept the amnesty debate out of prominence by tempering punishment with
leniency and helped decrease the divide among Americans on opposite sides of
the amnesty spectrum. Also, Ford’s program provided an opportunity for
reconciliation between America and its lost sons, the draft and military offenders
of the Vietnam Era. Finally, Ford’s program began the process of healing the
wounds caused by United States involvement in Vietnam. No amnesty plan, in
reality, could bridge the gulf between opposing sides within America. Ford’s
plan, however, was an excellent start.




An article titled “Limited Program, Limited Response” in the Monday,
September 30 edition Time provided an apt analysis of the problem with
resolving the issue of amnesty in post-Vietnam America:
No amnesty plan, of course, could be expected to bridge the gulf
between extreme views of the problem. To many, failure to fight
when the nation called was a cowardly, treasonable act and an
assault upon the values of all those who sacrificed so much. To
others, evasion of service in an unprincipled war was a
courageous and lonely act of high patriotism, challenging the
national conscience and making future such wars less
probable.196
Truly, a resolution to the issue of amnesty that appeased all sides could not be
found. Americans had firmly devoted them selves to believing in the cause for
or against amnesty and could not be satisfied by compromise. Choosing a side
and building a program around their beliefs regarding amnesty was the only way
to fully appease those involved in the amnesty debate, but that would lead to
belittling the views of the other side.  President Ford was clearly left to deal with
a complex issue upon his ascendancy to the Presidency.
Gerald R. Ford, upon becoming President, desired to reconcile and unify
a nation wracked by divisiveness as a result of American intervention in
Vietnam. One way to begin the healing of America was to deal with the amnesty
issue. Ford’s consideration of the amnesty issue, however, went beyond
considering the arguments and reactions of the differing sides of the amnesty
debate. President Ford, in his creation of a program of clemency for draft and
military offenders, addressed the variety of influences, including draft and
196 “Limited Program, Limited Response,” Time,  vol. 104, September 30, 1974, 24.
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military offenders, the amnesty debate, including its coverage in the news media
and the symbolic nature of the debate, public opinion and President Ford’s
political influences, in an attempt to resolve the issue in the best possible way
and begin repairing the social fabric of America.
Ford created a program that facilitated reconciliation between America
and draft and military offenders without exacerbating the divisions among
Americans regarding their fate. He had to deal with the issue of amnesty and the
fate of draft and military offenders in a way that would not hinder his attempts
to heal and rebuild a stronger America in the post-Vietnam era. He did this by
considering the fate of draft and military offenders and the publics’ views on
their fate to reach a resolution that was acceptable to the majority.
Also, in dealing with the issue of amnesty, President Ford had to
consider the amnesty debate. He examined both sides of the debate and created a
program that took into account the opinions of all sides of the debate as well as
the reaction to the creation of a program of clemency. Complicating his
evaluation of the amnesty debate was the transformation of the debate into a
battle for symbolic vindication. He created a program that considered all sides of
the debate while denying a symbolic victory for either side that would legitimize
their views on the war and amnesty. By choosing a middle ground resolution to
the amnesty issue, President Ford clearly showed how the amnesty debate and
its news coverage influenced his decision to extend clemency.
Ford was also influenced by his political colleagues and other prominent
figures in his decision to extend clemency to draft and military offenders. He
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was provided with a plethora of ideas to resolve the amnesty issue by political
colleagues and prominent figures that helped shape the creation of his clemency
program. On top of this, Ford was influenced by his predecessor Richard Nixon
and his inability to heal the wounds of America caused by turmoil of the 1960s.
Nixon’s less than savoury tactics only exacerbated the divide within America,
leaving Ford with a country that had lost faith in its elected leadership and was
further divided on the amnesty issue.
Lastly, Ford’s desire to heal the nation combined with his awareness that
the national constituency desired the same influenced his decision to deal with
the amnesty issue and determine the fate of draft and military offenders. After
the Vietnam debacle, many Americans wanted to move past the war and begin
rebuilding America. In order to do so, Americans needed Ford to deal with the
issue of amnesty, lay to rest the last divisive aspect of the war in Vietnam and
lead the nation towards a time of healing. President Ford attempted to meet these
needs and accomplish this through his offer of clemency to draft and military
offenders.
For President Ford, dealing with the fate of draft and military offenders
while appeasing the nation was a difficult task. Ford, however, did his best by
acknowledging the different influences on the creation of a program and
designed his clemency program so that it would be acceptable to everyone and
utilized by those willing to earn their re-entry into mainstream America.
Establishing a program of amnesty grew beyond benefitting draft and military
offenders and became a program that would benefit the nation. Rather than
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focusing on the benefits for the offenders, President Ford saw his clemency
program as a means to put the trials and tribulations of the Vietnam-era in the
past and reconcile the nation. Ford’s clemency program gave an opportunity to
draft and military offenders to reconcile with America, most importantly; it gave













Illegal War 6 8 11
American Tradition 0 3 0
Heal National Wounds 4 7 1
Legal Evasion 0 3 0
Premature Conscience 2 1 0
Peace With Enemies 1 4 2









Legalism 4 13 14
Legal War 0 1 0
Against Precedents 4 4 6
Against Premature
Morality 1 0 1
Insult to Those Who
Served 9 10 10
Substitution 0 1 0
Table 1.1
Coverage of the Amnesty Debate in Three Major
Newspapers
Number of Articles Supporting
Amnesty
Number of Articles Opposing
Amnesty
The New York Times 13 18
The Washington Post 26 29
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